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I. CATHOLIC JUDGES AND AMERICAN LAW 
It is an honor to be discussing Catholic judges and cooperation in sin at 
a university named for St. Thomas Aquinas, particularly alongside a larger-
than-life statue of St. Thomas More. More, the patron saint of statesman 
and of lawyers, was the first layman to be Lord Chancellor of England. 1 He 
was also a martyr who, at his execution for treason, declared himself the 
King's good servant, but God's first? 
For the first time in its history, the Supreme Court of the United States 
has a majority of Catholic Justices.3 The President making the relevant ap-
pointments did very well among Catholic voters in the 2004 presidential 
election despite running against a Catholic opponent. During the course of 
that campaign, some Catholic bishops promised to withhold communion 
from Catholic candidates whose positions were inconsistent with Catholic 
teaching. Some within the Catholic Church (the "Church") extend their crit-
icism to judges whose decisions are inconsistent with Catholic teaching and 
castigate Catholic schools for honoring them, raising the question whether 
such judges should also be denied communion. Some suggest that Catholic 
judges might be obliged to resign; others suggest that recusal in particular 
cases of conflict would be sufficient. 
In this environment, some worry that Catholic judges will not be faith-
ful to the law, while others worry that Catholic judges will not be faithful to 
the Church's teaching. Catholic judges, it seems to me, should be concerned 
with both their faithfulness to the law and to their informed consciences. 
The requisite quorum of the Supreme Court is six.4 If all of the 
Catholics on the Supreme Court were to resign, the Supreme Court would 
be completely disabled from functioning; if they were all to recuse them-
selves in a case, it would be disabled from deciding that case. Indeed, the 
same result would obtain if all but one of the Catholics were to resign or 
recuse. Moreover, there are thousands of Catholic judges in state and fed-
eral courts around the country. In these circumstances, it is crucial to ana-
lyze carefully both the moral obligations of Catholic judges and their legal 
obligations regarding recusal. 
There is some vague sense that raising these questions is somehow 
inappropriate or even anti-Catholic. While the nomination of John Roberts 
to the Supreme Court was before the Senate, Jonathan Turley reported that 
1. See Pope John Paul II, Apostolic Issued Motu Proprio Proclaiming Saint Thomas More 
Patron Saint of Statesmen and Politicians (Oct. 31, 2000), available at http://www.vatican.va! 
holyjather/john-pauUilmotu_proprio/index.htm (follow "Proclamation of St Thomas More as 
Patron of Statesmen and Politicians (October 31, 2000)"). 
2. PETER ACKROYD, THE LIFE OF THOMAS MORE 394 (1998). 
3. Neela Banerjee, Archbishop's Callfor Court Blessing Steers Clear of Issues, N.Y. lIMEs, 
Oct. 12,2006, at A12 (noting that the Supreme Court "has a Catholic majority for the first time" 
and the "five Catholics on the court are Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., and Justices Anthony 
M. Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, Antonin Scalia, and Samuel A. Alito, Jr."). 
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). 
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Senator Richard Durbin had asked Judge Roberts what he would do if the 
law required a ruling that the Catholic Church considered a sin, and that 
Roberts "answered after a long pause that he would probably have to recuse 
himself."5 Some criticized Senator Durbin for asking the question, claiming 
he was applying a religious test for office, and his spokesman quickly de-
nied the accuracy of the report. 6 
Senator Durbin did not ask such a question at the confirmation hear-
ings. Instead, Senator Specter engaged Judge Roberts in the following 
colloquy: 
Chairman SPECTER: There had been a question raised about your 
personal views, and let me digress from Roe for just a moment 
because I think this touches on an issue which ought to be settled. 
When you talk about your personal views, and as they may relate 
to your own faith, would you say that your views are the same as 
those expressed by John Kennedy when he was a candidate and 
he spoke to the Greater Houston Ministerial Association in Sep-
tember of 1960, "I do not speak for my church on public matters 
and the church does not speak for me"? 
Judge ROBERTS: I agree with that, Senator, yes. 
Chairman SPECTER: And did you have that in mind when you 
said, "There is nothing in my personal views that would prevent 
me from fully and faithfully applying the precedent as well as 
Casey"? 
Judge ROBERTS: Well, I think people's personal views on this is-
sue derive from a number of sources, and there's nothing in my 
personal views based on faith or other sources that would prevent 
me from applying the precedents of the Court faithfully under 
principles of stare decisis.7 
Neither Senator Specter nor any other senator pressed Judge Roberts on 
what he would do if something in his faith did prevent him from applying 
the law faithfully. This paper argues that the answer attributed to Judge 
Roberts by Turley-whether or not he actually said it-was the correct one. 
Indeed, in an often-overlooked paragraph immediately following the one 
quoted by Senator Specter from Kennedy's famous Houston Ministerial As-
sociation speech, John Kennedy stated: 
But if the time should ever come-and I do not concede any con-
flict to be remotely possible-when my office would require me 
to either violate my conscience or violate the national interest, 
5. Jonathan Turley, The Faith of John Roberts, L.A. TIMES, July 25, 2005, at Bl1. 
6. Charles Hurt, Durbin Offered Proof of Column: Writer Defends Roberts Piece, WASH. 
TIMES, Aug. 15,2005, at Al (reporting these developments as well as Professor Turley's defense 
of his original account). 
7. Confimu.uion Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of 
the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, l09th Congo 146 (2005), available at 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/senateljudiciary!sh 109-1 58lbrowse.html. 
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then I would resign the office; and I hope that any conscientious 
public servant would do likewise.8 
Although the duties of the office and the possibility of individual-case 
recusal are different for Presidents and judges, the fundamental point is the 
same: a public official, including a Catholic public official, can generally 
exercise official duties faithfully, but if a choice must be made between 
official duties and conscience, then the official duties must be given up. 
The fundamental conflict between the demands of morality and the 
demands of civil law can confront any judge. Indeed such a conflict can 
only be categorically avoided if a judge believes that the civil law and the 
moral law are inevitably coextensive. A judge could reach such a conclu-
sion either by viewing the civil law as the ultimate determinant of morality 
or by viewing adjudication as a license to interpret the law in whatever way 
necessary to make it accord with the judge's moral views. Few if any peo-
ple (and certainly no Christian, considering the condemnation of Jesus) 
would accept the former, and few, if any, judges would accept (or at the 
very least publicly endorse) the latter. The potential for conflict must be 
admitted by any judge who believes both that ascertaining the law is mean-
ingfully different from ascertaining one's own moral views and that the 
demands of the civil law are not the highest authority. If, as John Courtney 
Murray liked to put it, "two there are," a judge cannot simply blink away 
this possibility. 9 
8. Senator John F. Kennedy, Address to the Greater Houston Ministerial Association (Sept. 
12, 1960), available at http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/jfkhoustonministers.html; see 
also Nomination of Judge Antonin Scalia, to be Associate Justice at the Supreme Court of the 
United States Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Congo 44 (1986). available at http://www. 
gpoaccess.gov/congress/senate/judiciary/sh99-1 O64lbrowse.html (Justice Scalia stated that a judge 
should recuse himself "where he himself is personally convinced that he cannot decide the ques-
tion impartially because he feels so strongly about the morality of the issue."). 
9. See JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS ON 
THE AMERICAN PROPOSITION 206 (1960) (noting that "the Gelasian thesis, 'Two there are,' ... had 
been the dynamic of the Christian revolution"); id. at 207 (noting that Rousseau complained that 
[b]y separating the theological system from the political system [Jesus] brought it about 
that the State ceased to be one, and caused intemal divisions which have never ceased to 
agitate Christian peoples. From this twofold power there has resulted a perpetual con-
flict of jurisdiction which has rendered all good politics impossible in Christian states. 
No one has ever been able to know which one to obey, priest or political ruler.); 
id. (noting that Hobbes commented that "[t]emporal and spiritual government are but words 
brought into the world to make men see double and mistake their sovereign"). The reference to 
the Gelasian thesis is to a letter by Pope St. Gelasius I to Emperor Anastasius. which begins "Duo 
sunt." Catholic Encyclopedia: Pope S1. Gelasius I, http://www.newadvent.orglcathenl06406a.htm 
(last visited Apr. 7, 2007) ("there are two powers by which chiefly this world is ruled ... "). 
In commenting on this paper. Professor Amy Barrett noted that some judges "assume that 
service to the civil law, at least in a legitimate governmental regime, is always a morally neutral 
act." Amy Barrett, Address at the University of St. Thomas Law Journal Symposium: Catholicism 
and the Court (Nov. 10,2006) (on file with the University of S1. Thomas Law Journal). While she 
may well be right, I share her hope that judges and those who evaluate them will not rest content 
with this assumption. See JOHN D. DAVIS, THE MORAL OBLIGATIONS OF CATHOLIC CIVrL JUDGES 
112-13 (1953) (quoting Pope Pius XII that "a judge cannot simply throw responsibility for his 
decision from his shoulders. causing it to fallon the law and its authors"); id. at 113 (noting that a 
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Although these conflicts can arise for any judge, the focus of this paper 
is on Catholic moral theology. There are three reasons for this focus. First, 
and most basically, I am a Catholic law professor at a Catholic school, thus 
I am drawing on my own faith tradition. Second, this is an area of current 
controversy, with some Catholics concerned about the faithfulness of Cath-
olic judges to Catholicism, and some non-Catholics concerned about the 
faithfulness of Catholic judges to the law. Third, Catholic moral theology 
has longstanding tools with which to address the problem, tools that are 
insufficiently appreciated by critics, and I suspect by judges as well. 
This paper explores the basic tool that Catholic moral theology offers 
to handle situations where a judge's moral views and legal interpretation 
conflict-the doctrine of cooperation-and applies that tool in several par-
ticular circumstances. It is the work of a law professor exploring moral 
theology and attempting to bring the fruits of that exploration home to the 
practice of judging. My hopes are ambitious, more ambitious perhaps than 
they should be for a non-theologian. I hope this paper will be useful, first 
and foremost, to Catholic judges contemplating what actions to take. I also 
hope it will be useful to those who seek to evaluate the conduct of Catholic 
judges. Evaluators both inside and outside the Catholic Church would bene-
fit from greater attention to the nuanced nature of Catholic moral teaching 
and the varied kinds of cases confronting judges. Finally, I hope this article 
might be of some use even to judges who are not Catholic (and those who 
evaluate them). Particularly since Catholic teaching is rooted in reason 
(while bolstered by faith), they might find some insight in the approach of 
one faith tradition to the conflicts that they confront between law and moral 
judgment. 10 
Perhaps these questions could be safely ignored if there were little con-
flict between Catholic teaching and American law, but there are a host of 
areas where Catholic teaching and American law conflict. The following 
does not remotely attempt to be an exhaustive list of examples: The Church 
teaches that artificial contraception is wrong; 11 American law protects it. 12 
The Church teaches that direct abortion is wrong; 13 American law protects 
judge is "a cooperator, and shares the responsibility for the evil done" by an unjust law); SANFORD 
LEVINSON, WREsn.ING WITH DrVERSITy214-15 (2003) (noting that from the perspective of those 
who reject a "secular stance toward the world ... what the secularist positively describes as 
adherence to one's constitutional duty can be given the much more negative description of 
idolatry"). 
10. For recent papers addressing these issues written by a federal judge and a Jesuit law 
professor, see William H. Pryor, Jr., The Religious Faith and Judicial Duty of an American Catho-
lic Judge, 24 YALE L. & POL'y REv. 347 (2006); Gregory A. Kalscheur, Catholics in Public Life: 
Judges. Legislators. and Voters (Feb. 27. 2007). available at http://ssm.comlabstract=965600. 
II. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH: MOOlFlCATIONS FROM THE EOITIO TYPlCA Nos. 
2368-70 (2d. ed., U.S. Catholic Conf. 1997) [hereinafter CATECIllSM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH]. 
12. See Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
13. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 11, Nos. 2270-75. 
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it. 14 The Church teaches that fornication and homosexual conduct are 
wrong; IS American law protects both. 16 The Church teaches that the death 
penalty is almost always wrong;17 more than one thousand people have 
been executed under American law since 1976.18 The Church teaches that 
marriage is permanent;19 American law generally treats marriage as basi-
cally an at-will contract.20 The Church teaches the universal destination of 
all property and that private property is held under a social mortgage;21 
American law does not. The Church teaches a preferential option for the 
poor;22 American law does not. The Church teaches an obligation to wel-
come the alien;23 American law does not. The Church teaches conscientious 
objection to particular unjust wars;24 American law refuses to recognize 
selective conscientious objection?S 
It is important to acknowledge that the Church does not teach that the 
state must make laws against all sins. 
The tradition stretching back to Aquinas never held that the civil 
law could or should reproduce morality as such, that it could or 
should enforce all moral obligations. . .. Whether those entrusted 
with legislative authority for the common good should pass this 
or that law depends (even if the action prohibited by the law is 
truly immoral) upon a host of contingent prudential 
considerations.26 
14. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn. v. Casey, 510 U.S. 1309 (1994). 
15. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 11, Nos. 2353 (fornication), 2357-59 
(homosexual conduct). 
16. See Lawrence v. Tex., 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
Prior to Ulwrence, it was possible to view Eisenstadt as leaving states free to prohibit fornication, 
but that seems quite implausible after Ulwrence. 
17. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 11, No. 2267. 
18. Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steik.er, A Tale of Two Nations: Implementation of the 
Death Penalty in "Executing" versus "Symbolic" States in the United States, 84 TEX. L. REv. 
1869, 1873 (2006). 
19. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 11, Nos. 2382-86. 
20. Ann Laquer Estin, Economics and the Problem of Divorce, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUND-
TABLE 517, 528 (1995) (noting that current law "effectively converted the traditional marriage 
contract into something more akin to a traditional at-will employment contract or to a voluntary 
contractual association terminable at will by its members"). 
21. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note II, No. 2402; Pope John Paul II, 
Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, No. 42 (Dec. 20, 1987), available at http://www.vatican.valholyjather/ 
john_pauUiJencyclicals/documentslhf.jp-iLenc_30 121987 _sollicitudo-rei-socialis_en.htmL 
22. Pope John Paul II, Centesimus Annus, No. 57 (May 1, 1991), available at http://www. 
vatican. valholy _father/john_pauUiJencyclicals/documentslhf..,jp-i3nC 0105199 Ccentesimus-
annus3n.htrul. 
23. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note II, No. 2241. 
24. See United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Statement on Registration and Con-
scription for Military Service (Feb. 14, 1980), http://www.usccb.org/sdwp/peace/military.htm 
("We are sure of the moral validity of [Selective Conscientious Objection],,). 
25. See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971). 
26. Robert P. George & Gerard V. Bradley, John Paul II (1920-2005), in THE TEACHINGS OF 
MODERN CHRISTIANITY ON LAW, POLmcs, & HUMAN NATURE 220, 243 (John Witte, Jr. & Frank 
S. Alexander eds., 2006) [hereinafter THE TEACHINGS OF MODERN CHRISTIANITY]; see also An-
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Among those prudential considerations are whether such a law would be 
obeyed, whether it would be enforceable, and whether it would produce 
harmful effects.27 Prudence may call for leaving the protection of some 
moral obligations to subsidiary groups, rather than to the state?8 In some 
circumstances, then, the conflict is more apparent than real, in that Church 
teaching supports both the conclusion that x is sinful, and the conclusion 
that the law should not prohibit x. For this reason, a judge who, in accor-
dance with the law, simply withholds that hand of the state from enforcing a 
particular moral norm may be acting in perfect harmony with the teaching 
of the Catholic Church. 
To take an easy example, I am aware of no one today who thinks that 
prudence calls for laws against the use of artificial contraceptives.29 Thus a 
judge faces no genuine conflict between American law protecting the use of 
artificial contraceptives and the Church's teaching that they are sinfuPo 
Moreover, since the landmark pronouncement forty years ago in 
Dignitatis Humanae, the Catholic Church has proclaimed religious liberty 
for all.31 Accordingly, a judge faces no genuine conflict in adhering to the 
gela Cannella, John Courtney Murray, S.J. (1904-1967), in THB TEACHINGS OF MODERN CHRISTI-
ANITY 115, 121 (noting that the "Thomist tradition never permits the direct translation of a moral 
norm into the terms of human law"); Pope Benedict XVI, Deus Est Caritas, No. 28 (Dec. 25, 
2(05), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy _fatherlbenedicCxviJencyc1icals/documentsIhC 
ben-xvLenc20051225_deus-caritas-esCen.htrn1: 
The Church cannot and must not take upon herself the political battle to bring about the 
most just society possible .... [S]he cannot and must not remain on the sidelines in the 
fight for justice. . .. A just society must be achievement of politics, not of the Church. 
27. Cannella, supra note 26, at 127. 
28. Jd. 
29. An even easier case is masturbation. See CATECmSM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra 
note 11, No. 2352 (stating that masturbation is an offense against chastity). 
30. See id. at No. 2366; Pope Paul VI, Humanae Vitae, (July 25, 1968), available at http:// 
www.vatican.va/holy _father/paul_ vi/encyclicalsldocuments/hCp-vi_enc_25071968_humanae-vi-
tae_en.htrn1 (stating that "each and every marital act must of necessity retain its intrinsic relation-
ship to the procreation of human life" and emphasizing that "the unitive significance and the 
procreative significance ... are both inherent to the marriage act"); Cannella, supra note 26, at 
127 (noting John Courney Murray's arguments in favor of decriminalizing contraception). There 
is, of course, considerable debate about whether some items that are sold as contraceptives actu-
ally function at times as abortifacients, a debate that some in the medical community attempt to 
preempt by definitional fiat--decreeing pregnancy to begin upon implantation rather than concep-
tion but not bothering to tell their patients (who may well disagree) that this is the definition they 
are using. See, e.g., Charles E. Rice, Abonion, Euthanasia, and the Need to Build a New 'Culture 
of Life,' 12 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PuB. POL'y 497 (1998). 
31. See John T. Noonan, Jr., Development in Moral Doctrine, 54 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 662, 
667 (1993) (noting that "no later than the time of St. Augustine, it was considered virtuous for 
bishops to invoke imperial force to compel heretics to return to the church"; that for more than 
1200 years, the Church denied the religious liberty of heretics, viewing falsifiers of the faith as 
subject to execution in the same way that forgers are executed for debasing the currency; and, that 
all this "changed quite recently"); id. at 668 ("No distinction was now drawn between the relig-
ious freedom of infidels (in theory always respected) and the religious freedom of heretics, once 
trampled on in theory and practice."), 
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legal requirements of the First Amendment and, for example, refusing to 
punish someone who refuses to love God.32 
Yet this limitation, while· important, only goes so far. For example, it 
does not help in those situations, such as abortion, where the Church's 
teaching requires the state to act and provide legal protection.33 Nor does it 
help in situations, such as the death penalty, where the Church's teaching is 
specifically directed to limiting the action of the state.34 More generally, it 
offers no help except in those situations where the state is permissibly de-
clining to intervene in the behavior of non-governmental individuals and 
entities.35 
This paper examines and applies the doctrine of cooperation in several 
particular circumstances. Significantly, this doctrine helps us to see clearly 
that all judicial decisions involving the areas of conflict are not the same.36 
To use Dean John Garvey's imagery, in some cases the conflict is head-on, 
while in others the conflict is at a more or less glancing angle.37 In this 
latter situation, it may well be possible to accommodate both of the conflict-
ing demands. 
Finally, it is sometimes thought that Catholic teaching is a set of rules 
imposed by a lawmaking authority on those subject to its jurisdiction. To 
this way of thinking, the Catholic Church adopts a rule and therefore 
Catholics must follow that rule: the Church's rule makes it wrong for 
Catholics to engage in certain behavior. But while there are some rules like 
that (such as the Lenten discipline of fast and abstinence), for the vast ma-
jority of Catholic teaching this view is pretty much backward. 
The Church's teaching is just that-teaching. That is, the Church at-
tempts to ascertain the moral truth and teach that truth. In other words, an 
act is not wrong because the Church says it is wrong; instead, the Church 
32. Cf CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH. supra note 1, No. 2094 (stating that to "refuse 
to acknowledge divine charity and to return him love for love" is a "sin against God's love"). 
33. 1£1. at No. 2273. 
34. Id. at No. 2267. 
35. Moreover, any attempt to define with precision the situations in this category are likely to 
run into the same difficulties that best the state action problem in American Constitutional law; in 
any case, some state action can be found, if only in the willingness to enforce the background 
rules of property. See, e.g., Paul Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Casenote on Flagg 
Brothers v. Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1296, 1321 (1982). Thus, a refusal to redistribute re-
sources from the rich to the poor might, at first blush, be viewed simply as the state declining to 
intervene, but if one conceives of the question as involving the legitimacy of the underlying prop-
erty right of the rich in the first place, the state is not simply declining to intervene but acting to 
protect that property right. 
36. I make no attempt to examine all areas where Catholic teaching and American law con-
flict, or even all areas where the conflict is more apparent than real, because prudence calls for the 
law to stay its hand; nor do I focus on the question of whether and to what extent a judge's 
religious views properly inform his or her legal views. 
37. John Garvey, Dean, Boston College Law School, Remarks at a Meeting of the Law 
Professors' Christian Fellowship: Panel on The Faithful Judge: How Can a Judge Be Faithful to 
Both Christ and Law? (Jan. 7, 2006). 
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says that an act is wrong because it is wrong. Unlike Lenten regulations that 
bind only Catholics, when the Church teaches that an act is wrong, it does 
so because it believes that it is wrong-not just for Catholics, but for all 
persons.38 
The Church seeks to inform people's consciences, insists that con-
sciences be well-informed, and recognizes that consciences may be mis-
taken-but has nevertheless long taught that a person "must always obey 
the certain judgment of his conscience."39 
This emphasis on conscience sometimes comes as a surprise to non-
Catholics, and even some Catholics. It certainly does not mean that the 
Catholic Church accepts relativism. To the contrary, it insists that there is 
such thing as objective moral truth, that it is the task of reason to find it, and 
that as Aquinas put it, "the will is bound to follow reason, right or 
wrong."40 One of the staunchest defenders of the Church's teaching was 
once criticized for writing a book that attempted to answer moral questions 
people had posed to him, with the critic contending that the author should 
tell them to follow their own consciences.41 He replied, "Of course I tell 
people that, but some people think they need help in forming their 
consciences. "42 
This emphasis on conscience means that some (perhaps even most or 
all) Catholic judges will have consciences at variance with some aspect of 
the Church's teaching. To the extent that a judge's conscience corresponds 
with the law, the conflict with which this paper is concerned does not arise. 
On the other hand, to whatever extent the judge's conscience does not cor-
38. Professor Tamanaha misses this point when he suggests that Catholic moral doctrine 
permits a Catholic to ask someone else to do for him what he is forbidden to do himself. Brian Z. 
Tamanaha, Good Casuistry and Bad Casuistry: Resolving the Dilemmas Faced by Catholic 
Judges, 4 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 269 (2007) (making comparison with use of goyim and separate 
discussion of judges); cf ALBERT R. JONSEN & STEPHEN ToULMlN, THE ABUSE OF CASUISTRY: A 
HISTORY OF MORAL REAsONING 58 (1988) (noting that the vast bulk of the Halakhah constitutes 
law that is only applicable to the Jewish community rather than morality "making equal claims on 
all human beings"). I also believe that Jewish teaching regarding the use of goyim to do work 
forbidden on the Sabbath is far more complex than Tamanaha's discussion reveals, but I will not 
attempt to pursue that here. 
39. CATECHISM OF THE CATHODC CHURCH, supra note 11, No. 1790 ("A human being must 
always obey the certain judgment of his conscience."); HERIBERT JONE, MORAL THEOLOGY § 87 
(Rev. Urban Adelman trans., 1947) (1945) ("A certain conscience must always be obeyed."); 
FRANK J. McNULTY & EDWARD WAKIN, SHOULD YOUR EVER FEEL GUILTY? 37 (1978) ("Laws 
perform various functions, but they are not the final word. The individual conscience is."). 
40. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, 197 (Timothy McDermott ed., 1989); see gen-
erally Pope John Paul II, Veritatis Splendor (Aug. 6, 1993), available at http://www.vatican.val 
edocsIENG0222UNDEX.HTM. 
41. 3 GERMAIN GRISEZ, THE WAY OF THE LORD JESUS: DIFFICULT MORAL QUESTIONS xvi 
(1997). 
42. [d.; see also id. at xviii (noting that when pointing out that someone seems to have done 
or is about to do something wrong, "one must not judge and condemn the person: God alone 
knows whether and how clearly he or she knows that the act is wrong, and whether and how freely 
he or she chooses to act contrary to that conscience"). 
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respond with the law (even if it also does not correspond to the Church's 
teaching), the conflict does arise.43 
II. COOPERATION AND ITS CONTEXT 
A. Formal versus Material Cooperation 
Under the doctrine of cooperation, a person may never formally coop-
erate in the sin of another, but may, in some situations, materially cooperate 
in the sin of another. The doctrine is by no means limited to judges, but 
rather addresses the wide range of situations in which one person helps 
another to sin. And in an interdependent and sinful world, much of what we 
do helps others to sin in some way. As Germain Grisez has noted: 
Some unreflective and/or unsophisticated people imagine 
problems involving cooperation can (and perhaps should) be 
avoided by altogether avoiding cooperation. That, however, is vir-
tually impossible and sometimes inconsistent with doing one's 
duty. Grocers materially cooperate with gluttonous eating, letter 
carriers with the use of pornography, and so on; and in many 
cases such people need their jobs to support themselves and their 
families. And though taxpayers materially cooperate with nuclear 
deterrence and other evils, paying taxes is morally obligatory 
44 
Indeed, Father James F. Keenan, S.1., has suggested that the doctrine of 
cooperation "can serve as a paradigm for the modem Christian who seeks to 
43. There is no good adjective (of which I am aware) for Catholics whose consciences are 
fully in accord with Church teaching. "Traditional" is one possibility, but many traditional 
Catholics adhere to older views concerning the death penalty. "Orthodox" is another possibility, 
but that runs the risk of confusion with the Eastern Church. (Use of the term "Catholic" rather 
than "Roman Catholic" runs a similar risk, but in the United States, the unmodified word "Catho-
lic" is generally read as a reference to Roman Catholic.) John Garvey and Amy Coney [Barrett] 
struggled with a similar problem "in choosing an adjective that means nothing more nor less than 
'faithful to the teaching of the church on the subject of capital punishment:" John H. Garvey & 
Amy V. Coney [Barrett], Catholic Judges in Capital Cases, 81 MARQ. L. REv. 303, 305 n.8 
(1998). They settled for "orthodox" despite the risk of confusion with eastern churches and its use 
as a SOCiological term allied with religious conservativism. They also considered and rejected 
"observant" because it tends to signify participation in the sacraments and rituals of the church. Id. 
"Faithful" is sometimes used, but that suggests that all others are not faithful. A colleague sug-
gested the term "iso-Catholic," but I fear that this neologism may prove unhelpful and perbaps 
even offensive. This paper will simply use the term Catholic without any adjective, while ac-
knowledging from the outset that, for a variety of reasons (good and bad), not all Catholics adhere 
to the teaching of the Catholic Church. Nor do I attempt in this paper to evaluate the correctness or 
propriety of those various reasons. 
44. 3 GRISEZ, supra note 41, at 871. "Moreover, in God's absolutely good act of sustaining 
the creatures he has chosen to create, he accepts as side effects all the wrongdoing and other evil 
in the universe ... and Jesus teaches us to be like our heavenly Father. who sustains both sinners 
and upright people .... So, good people sometimes ruay and even should cooperate in others' 
wrongdoing, and cases involving cooperation require careful analysis and judgment." 1£1 at 
871-72. 
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make the world a better place by neither compromising values nor detach-
ing oneself from a world ridden with complexities."45 
Pope John Paul II emphasized the importance of the doctrine of coop-
eration in connection with unjust laws: 
The passing of unjust laws often raises difficult problems of con-
science for morally upright people with regard to the issue of co-
operation, since they have a right to demand not to be forced to 
take part in morally evil actions. Sometimes the choices which 
have to be made are difficult; they may require the sacrifice of 
prestigious professional positions or the relinquishing of reasona-
ble hopes of career advancement. In other cases, it can happen 
that carrying out certain actions, which are provided for by legis-
lation that overall is unjust, but which in themselves are indiffer-
ent, or even positive, can serve to protect human lives under 
threat. There may be reason to fear, however, that willingness to 
carry out such actions will not only cause scandal and weaken the 
necessary opposition to attacks on life, but will gradually lead to 
further capitulation to a mentality of permissiveness. 
In order to shed light on this difficult question, it is necessary to 
recall the general principles concerning cooperation in evil ac-
tions. Christians, like all people of good will, are called upon 
under grave obligation of conscience not to cooperate formally in 
practices which, even if permitted by civil legislation, are con-
trary to God's law. Indeed, from the moral standpoint, it is never 
licit to cooperate formally in evil. Such cooperation occurs when 
an action, either by its very nature or by the form it takes in a 
concrete situation, can be defined as a direct participation in an 
act against innocent human life or a sharing in the immoral inten-
tion of the person committing it.46 
So, too, did Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, prior to being named Pope Bene-
dict XVI. As he stated in a letter to Theodore Cardinal McCarrick: 
A Catholic would be guilty of formal cooperation in evil, and so 
unworthy to present himself for Holy Communion, if he were to 
deliberately vote for a candidate precisely because of the candi-
date's permissive stand on abortion and/or euthanasia. When a 
Catholic does not share a candidate's permissive stand on abor-
tion and/or euthanasia, but votes for that candidate for other rea-
45. James F. Keenan, Prophylactics, Toleration, and Cooperation: Contemporary Problems 
and Traditional Principles, 29lNr'L PmL. Q. 205, 218 (1989). See also M. Cathleen Kaveny & 
James F. Keenan, Notes on Moral Theology (Ethical Issues in Health-Care Restructuring), 56 
THEOLOGICAL STUD. 92, 145 (1995) (noting the "unavoidable tension between distancing oneself 
from morally prohibited activity and maintaining sufficient power to act on behalf of the good, 
which lies at the heart of the principle of cooperation"). 
46. Pope John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae. No. 74 (Mar. 25. 1995), available at http://www. 
vatican. valholy jather/john_pauUi/encyclicalsJdocumentslhfjp-ii_enc_25031995 _evangelium-
vitae3n.hlml. 
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sons, it is considered remote material cooperation, which can be 
permitted in the presence of proportionate reasons.47 
To a contemporary lawyer, the doctrine tends at ftrst blush to appear 
backward. The word "formal" today frequently suggests a mere technical-
ity, one that need not seriously detain anyone from the real underlying con-
cern. It is common to criticize someone for focusing too much on form and 
not sufftciently on substance. The word "material," by contrast, frequently 
suggests signiftcant or meaningful, as in the requirement for summary judg-
ment that there be no "genuine issue of material fact,"48 or the requirement 
that evidence be material in order to be admissible.49 In this usage, some-
thing can easily be "merely" formal, but can hardly be "merely" material. 
Thus formal cooperation in sin sounds eminently excusable, while material 
cooperation in sin sounds far more signiftcant and serious. 
In Catholic moral theology, however, the words "formal" and "mate-
rial" retain a rather different, older meaning. Formal cooperation occurs 
when one shares the sinful intention of another, while material cooperation 
occurs when one helps another to sin without sharing in his or her sinful 
intention. 50 It is crucial to see, then, that the very same "outward behavior 
can be either formal or material cooperation, depending on what the cooper-
ator intends.,,51 For example, a police offtcer who prevents pro-life workers 
from talking to women approaching abortion clinics because he wants wo-
men to have abortions is engaged in formal cooperation, while a police 
offtcer who does the same thing because she does not want to lose her job 
by refusing the assignment is engaged in material cooperation. 52 
To appreciate the terminology, it may be helpful to bear in mind the 
distinction drawn by Thomas Aquinas and Aristotle between form and mat-
ter. In their metaphysics, something's "form" is its essence-what makes it 
47. Memorandum from Cardinal Ratzinger to Cardinal McCarrick, Worthiness to Receive 
Holy Communion (July 9, 2004), available at http://www.priestsforlife.org/magisteriumlbishops/ 
04-07ratzingerommunion.htm. 
48. FED. R. ClY. P. 56. 
49. See Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 107 YALE 
L.J. 1535, 1544 n.19 (1998) ("The modem, statutorily enacted Federal Rules of Evidence have 
eliminated the handy reference to the distinction between materiality and relevance that was a 
centerpiece of the common law of evidence (though they fortunately have not eliminated the 
effective legal significance of the distinction itself). In the common law system, evidence was said 
to be 'relevant' if it tended to establish the point for which it was offered. It was 'material' if the 
point for which the evidence was offered actually bore on issues in the case."). 
50. See, e.g., I THOMAS SLATER, A MANUAL OF MORAL THEOLOGY FOR ENGLISH-SPEAKING 
COUNTRIES 203 (Michael Martin ed., 1908) ("Cooperation, then, may be formal or material. For-
mal cooperation is concurrence in the bad action of another and in the bad intention with which it 
is performed. Material cooperation is the concurrence in the external action of another but not in 
the evil intention with which it is done."). 
51. 3 GRlSEZ, supra note 41, at 874. 
52. Id. 
2006] CATHOLIC JUDGES AND COOPERATION IN SIN 233 
it-while matter is simply the stuff that, in fact, takes on and loses different 
forms. 53 
The most enduring insight of Aristotle, taken up and developed 
by Thomas Aquinas, was that every constituent of the natural 
world is what it is by virtue of its essence. The essence of a thing 
is the intelligible form or unifying principle that constitutes the 
thing. This is what distinguishes a thing from every other sort of 
thing that is. It is one thing to be constituted as a horse, quite 
another to be constituted as a human being. Contrary to the 'nom-
inalist' tradition that denied that in the givens of the world are 
essences that would and should guide their development, the Tho-
mistic tradition insisted upon the reality of essences. These es-
sences are the stable but dynamic structures that determine--or, 
in the face of human freedom, ask to determine-what is in, or 
what will come into, being.54 
As John Finnis has noted, "In Aquinas' philosophy, 'form' and formale 
refer to what is most essential to something being what it is-almost the 
exact opposite meaning from the modern idiomatic English '(mere) formal-
ity.' "55 Form, then, is what something is in its essence, while matter is more 
arbitrary, indeed, accidental. 
In this usage, something can easily be "merely" material, but can 
hardly be "merely" formal. So understood, formal cooperation in sin is ac-
tion that is the essence of sinful assistance in another's sin, while material 
cooperation is action that does, as a factual matter, assist another to sin, but 
is not in its essence sinful assistance. 
B. Cooperation and Related Doctrines 
Overcoming this terminological hurdle, however, is only the first step 
to applying the doctrine of cooperation. Although the doctrine "offers a 
thorough calculus for moral decision making ... many avoid it because ... 
there is 'no more difficult question than this in the whole range of Moral 
Theology.' "56 
53. See S. Marc Cohen, Aristotle on Substance, Matter, and Form 8 (2004), http://faculty. 
washington.eduismcohenl320IMetaphysics.pdf ("For Aristotle, the form of a compound substance 
is essential to it; its matter is accidental. (Socrates could have been composed of different matter 
from that of which he is actually composed.)."); AQUINAS, supra note 40, at 39 (referring to the 
"form which makes a thing what it is"); id. at 84 ("Eady philosophers felt their way to the truth 
slowly step by step. They began somewhat crudely by thinking that only bodies we can sense 
exist, that the essential substance of such bodies [what they are] is uncaused, and that they change 
only [how they are 1 in inessentials. . . . Later they worked out the distinction within essential 
substance between its matter ... and the form of substance taken on by such matter .... "). 
54. Patrick McKinley Brennan, Jacques Maritain (1882-1973), in THE TEACHINGS OF Mol).. 
ERN CHRISTIANITY, supra note 26, at 82. 
55. John Finnis, Helping Enact Unjust Laws Without Complicity in Injustice, 49 AM. J. 
JURIs. II, 41 n.59 (2004). 
56. THE NEW DICTIONARY OF CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT 234 (Judith A. Dwyer ed., 1994) 
(quoting HENRY DAVIS, MORAL AND PASTORAL THEOLOGY 342 (1958». 
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I have found two approaches particularly helpful in getting a handle on 
the doctrine of cooperation and its applications. The ftrst (which I develop 
in this Part) is to situate the doctrine of cooperation in the context of related 
doctrines of Catholic moral theology. The second (which I utilize in Parts 
III and IV) is to see how theologians have applied the doctrine in a variety 
of cases. I have found considerable help in both areas, to my surprise, in the 
manuals of moral theology, a genre that largely defined the field of moral 
theology for centuries, but that has fallen out of favor and largely died out 
in the wake of Vatican II. 57 
These manuals were designed to prepare seminarians to hear confes-
sion.58 They resemble legal hornbooks, in that they are highly organized, 
set forth general principles, and explain how those general principles apply 
to particular cases.59 In the latter aspect, they are a form of casuistry, a term 
that has acquired rather negative connotations, but frankly bears considera-
ble resemblance to the common law method.60 They have been roundly 
57. See JOHN A. GALLAGHER. TIME PAST. TIME FUTURE: AN HISTORICAL STUDY OF CATHO-
UC MORAL THEOLOGY 29 (1990) (noting that the manuals "served as major instruments in the 
theological and ministerial education of Roman Catholic priests for almost four hundred years. 
They continued to be a major element in seminary education until the eve of the Second Vatican 
Council (1963-65)."). 
The closest modem analogue can be found in 3 GRISEZ. supra note 41. a work to which I 
have already referred and will do so further. Grisez offers far more discussion of any particular 
question than the manuals. but he has not chosen and structured those questions amund particular 
moral principles; indeed. there is scant organization to the questions at all. 
58. See, e.g., RICHARD M. GULA, REASON INFORMED BY FAITH: FOUNDATIONS OF CATHOLIC 
MORALITY 26 (1989) ("The origins of Roman Catholic moral theology as a distinct discipline go 
hand in hand with the Council of Trent's decrees regarding the sacrament of penance."); id. (not-
ing that the "manuals of moral theology" were handbooks for confessors, designed to provide 
instruction on "forming a proper conscience, on solving cases of conscience. and on making a 
precise determination of sins so as to make a proper confession"). 
59. Indeed, when moral theology was taught to seminarians from these handbooks, an exam 
in moral theology was like a torts exam, but rather than finding all of the torts in a complex factual 
scenario, the task was to find all the sins. (My description of such a moral theology exam is drawn 
from conversation with Fr. Frank McNulty, former professor of moral theology at Immaculate 
Conception Seminary.) 
60. The OXFORD ENGUSH DICTIONARY defines casuistry as the "science, art, or reasoning of 
the casuist; that part of Ethics which resolves cases of conscience, applying the general rules of 
religion and morality to particular instances in which 'circumstances alter cases; or in which there 
appears to be a conflict of duties." OXFORD ENGUSH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989), available at 
www.oed.com (search for "casuistry"). While it notes that the term "[o]ften (and perhaps origi-
nally) applied to a quibbling or evasive way of dealing with difficult cases of duty," and offers the 
term "casuism" as a "term of more respectful application," it has no entry for "casuism." Id. 
In his response to this paper, Professor TamanalJa joins the ranks of casuistry's critics. See 
Tamanaha, supra note 38, at 278 (referring to his suspicions about "casuistic analysis"); see gen-
erally JONSEN & TOULMIN, supra note 38, at 11-13 (noting casuistry being in disrepute since 
Blaise Pascal's Provincial Letters in the mid-seventeenth century, and its rehabilitation in works 
such as Sissela Bok's LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PuBUC AND PRIVATE LIFE (1978) and Michael 
Walzer's JUST AND UNJUST WARS (1977»; id. at 69 (noting connection between casuistry and 
Anglo-American common lawyers); THE CONTEXT OF CASmSTRY (James F. Keenan & Thomas A. 
Shannon ed8., 1995); Thomas R. Kopfensteiner, Science, Metaphor, and Moral Casuistry, in THE 
CONTEXT OF CASUISTRY, supra, at W7 ("In spite of the ample criticism of the casuistry found 
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within the neoscholastic manuals of theology, the casuist's art of applying principles and norms to 
concrete situations and problems is still a necessary part of the moral enterprise."). 
Perhaps Professor Tarnanaha finds himself more attracted to prophecy than casuistry. See 
Tamanaha, supra note 38 at 272 (claiming that "[c]asuistic reasoning allows participation in these 
sinful activities without violating church teachings and moral principles"). See generally Cathleen 
M. Kaveny, Prophecy and Casuistry: Abortion, Torture, and Moral Discourse, 51 VILL. L. REv. 
499 (2006). Prophecy, of course, is a noble calling. Judges, however, are not prophets, they are 
casuists-they decide particular cases. See id. at 511 ("[L]awyers and judges in common law 
countries ... engage in casuistical reasoning."); see also ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: 
ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 259 (1975) ("If a man makes a good priest, we may be 
quite sure he will not be a great prophet."); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Accusing Justice: Some 
Variations on the Themes of Robert M. Cover's Justice Accused, 7 J.L. & REuGlON 33, 96 (1990) 
(noting that "Bob Carver was a prophet, not a priest," and that "[j]udges are bound to disappoint 
such a man"). For a propbetic call regarding judges and law professors regarding abortion and the 
death penalty, see Bruce Ledewitz, An Essay Concerning Judicial Resignation and Non-Coopera-
tion in the Presence of Evil, 27 DUQ. L. REv. I, 16 (1988) (suggesting that "it may not be possible 
to remain a judge at all in a society that allows, and encourages, abortion" and that the "law 
professor who teaches abortion's pro's and con's, who teaches the reasoning of Roe v. Wade, is 
equally gUilty of lending support to abortion"). 
More generally, I find Professor Tamanaha's description of a moral dilemma nearly un-
recognizable. Tamanaha, supra note 38, at 278 ("We face moral dilemmas all the time. Often we 
experience a dilemma not because the course charted by the applicable moral principles is unclear, 
but because for one reason or another we would prefer not to follow that course.") (emphasis 
omitted). Of course, there are situations when we know tbe right thing to do and must struggle 
against fear and selfishness to do the right thing. But such a moral struggle hardly qualifies as a 
dilemma. "Moral dilemmas, at the very least, involve conflicts between moral requirements." 
Terrance McConnell, Moral Dilemmas, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILoSOPHY (Ed-
ward N. Zalta ed., Summer 2006), available at http://plato.stanford.edularchives!sum2006/entriesl 
moral-dilemmas. Some may reserve the term for sittrations where no morally-correct resolution is 
possible and argue whether such true moral dilemmas exist; others use the term more broadly for 
sittrations where there are competing moral demands, which can, on further analysis, be resolved. 
See id.; OxFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d. ed. 1989), available at www.oed.com (search for 
"dilemma") (defining dilemma as a "choice between two ... alternatives. which are or appear 
equally unfavourable"). Those competing moral demands include providing for oneself and one's 
family, as well as participating in work, politics, and society in order to contribute to the common 
gond. 
Professor Tamanaha's approach gives us no tools to deal with those competing demands. For 
example, how would Professor Tamanaha advise an American citizen who found the United 
States invasion of Iraq in 2003 to be unjust? Must she vote against any candidate who supported 
the invasion? Refuse to pay federal income taxes? Refuse to pay Social Security taxes? Move to 
France? Once in France, refuse to buy goods made in the United States? To say that moral princi-
ple requires all of these things strikes me as bordering on fundamentalist: once we identify an evil, 
the right thing to do is to avoid even the slightest connection to that evil no matter the competing 
moral demands. To say that some are permissible but others are not requires casuistry. Professor 
Tamanaha properly reminds us that casuistry. like all human reasoning, runs the risk of rationali-
zation. See Tamanaha, supra note 38, at 270. But casuistry also involves the down-to-earth wres-
tling with particular cases, just as judges must do, but we academics have the lUXUry of avoiding if 
we choose. See also Kaveny, supra note 60, at 569 (noting that casuistry is "an effort to discern 
the appropriate course of action in the case at hand, in part by taking account of what has been 
judged the appropriate course of action in similar cases" and that one way in which "casuistry 
tends to go wrong" is when it is "employed disingenuously ... to justify a decision that was 
reached on other grounds"); id. at 572 ("We cannot do without casuistry or practical reasoning 
about what to do in concrete cases."); JONSEN & TOULMIN, supra note 38, at 92 (noting that "the 
kind of problem that generates casuistical thinking [is] a conflict of basic obligations"); id. at 127 
(stating that the medieval term for what we call casuistry was casus conscientiae, that is, "cases of 
conscience"); cf. LEVINSON, supra note 9, at 237-38 (noting that one advantage to reading cases is 
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criticized as legalistic, too focused on the individual act rather than one's 
overall fundamental commitments, and written from the perspective of a 
third-party analyzing another's actions (a priest hearing confession) rather 
than the actor himself.61 However powerful these criticisms may be in gen-
eral, these very same factors are actually of some advantage in this context. 
When the question is how a judge should behave, it is hardly a significant 
criticism that the proposed analysis is legalistic. When the question is how a 
judge should handle a particular case or set of cases, it is useful to be fo-
cused on individual actions rather than overall fundamental commitments. 
Indeed, since judges will typically face serious conflicts only rarely, the 
judge's overall fundamental commitments are seldom at stake; instead, 
what is needed is guidance for particular situations and warning signs about 
particular situations that may, if not heeded, pose some threat to one's fun-
damental commitments. Finally, since this essay is intended to be of use not 
only to judges but also to those who evaluate them, even the third-party 
perspective of the manuals can be an asset. 
The doctrine of cooperation is closely related to two different aspects 
of Catholic moral theology, the duties associated with the virtue of charity 
and the principle of double effect. Indeed, there is a sense in which it sits at 
the intersection of these two ideas. 
that "the confrontation with fascinating facts ... suppl[iesJ a concreteness sometimes lacking in 
the writings of philosophers," and that "through responding to concrete examples ... one's intu-
itions are best examined"}. 
61. See, e.g., Martin Rhonheimer. Intentional Actions and the Meaning of Object: A Reply to 
Richard McCormick, 59 THOMIST 279, 304 (1995) (describing the "traditional manuals" as "rather 
legalistic, focusing on the external features of actions, referring them to positive law, and only 
secondarily applying some corrections to recuperate important intentional aspects"); cf. Richard 
A. McCormick. Moral Theology 1940-1989: An Overview, 50 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 3-4 (1989) 
(noting that the manuals were "all too often one-sidedly confession-oriented, magisterium-domi-
nated. canon law-related, sin-centered, and seminary-controlled," yet were also "very pastoral and 
prudent. critically respectful, realistic, compassionate, open and charitable, well-informed"); id. at 
20 (noting that "there is pastoral wisdom there [in the manuals] that remains somewhat underval-
ued, largely because it is unknown"); TIMOTHY E. O'CONNELL, PRINCIPLES FOR A CATHOLIC Mo-
RALITY 20 (rev. ed., HarperColiins 1990) (1978) (noting that although "one could hardly celebrate 
the manuals as paradigms of profound moral theology," they "often functioned as voices of rea-
son, guiding the confessor away from the extremes and toward the moderate position"). Disdain 
for casuistry within the Catholic Church dates back at least to the time of Saint Alphonsus: 
There are some who pride themselves on being well read and on being theologians of 
high repute but who would not lower themselves to read the moral theologians: Casu-
ists, they call them, with an insulting tone. They say it is enough, for hearing confes-
sions, to have the general principles of moral theology, since with these all the 
individual cases can be solved. Who denies that all the cases have to be solved with 
principles? But, here is the problem: how to apply to individual cases the principles that 
are appropriate to them. This cannot be done without a serious discussion of the argu-
ments on one and the other side. This is precisely what the moral theologians have 
done. They have tried to clarify which principles should be used in the resolution of 
individual cases. 
ALPHONSUS DE LIGUORI, SELECTED WRTITNGS 319-20 (Frederick M. Jones ed., Paulist Press 
1999). 
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t. Charity, Fraternal Correction, and Scandal 
Charity is a "supernatural, infused virtue, by which we love God above 
everything for His own sake, and our neighbor as ourselves for God's 
sake. "62 It imposes "duties over and beyond those of justice to our fellow 
creatures, whom we recognize as having the same nature, the same destiny, 
the same Redeemer as ourselves."63 Among the duties of charity are alms-
giving and fraternal correction.64 Fraternal correction is a "private admoni-
tion given to another to withdraw from his sin or to prevent his sinning."65 
Both of these duties are limited. One is not obliged in charity to sell all that 
he owns and give to the poor. Moreover, it "would be foolish to admonish 
all and sundry on every occasion."66 For the obligation to be serious, "the 
neighbour's necessity should be serious and actual, there should be reasona-
ble hope of success, and no grave personal inconvenience to him who cor-
rects."67 Indeed, admonition 
may be deferred for the sake of greater future good or in doubt as 
to success, and may be omitted altogether . . . when there are 
well-grounded fears lest the neighbour should be completely es-
tranged by the correction, or when his sin or danger are uncertain, 
or when he is likely soon to correct himself, or when there are 
others who could equally well correct him.68 
One of the sins against fraternal charity is scandal. In common parlance, 
scandal refers to some wrongdoing or embarrassing action that is uncov-
ered. In Catholic moral theology, however, it refers to "an attitude or behav-
ior which leads another to do evil."69 Typically, scandal operates by giving 
a bad example: if an otherwise good and respected person is doing x, then 
62. NEW CATHOLIC DICTIONARY (19\0), available at http://www.catholic-fornm.comJ 
SAINTS/ncdc.htm (follow the "charity" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 14, 20(7); see also CATE. 
CHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note II, No. 1822 ("Charity is the theological virtue by 
which we love God above all things for his own sake, and our neighbor as ourselves for the love 
of God."). 
63. NEW CATHOLIC DICTIONARY, supra note 62 (follow the "charities" hyperlink). 
64. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note II, No. 1829 ("[C]harity demands 
beneficence and fraternal correction; it is benevolence; it fosters reciprocity and remains disinter-
ested and generous."). 
65. I HENRY DAVIS, MORAL AND PASTORAL THEOLOGY 327 (L.W. Geddes ed., 8th ed. 1959) 
(1935). 
66. [d. 
67. [d. at 328. 
68. [d. 
69. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 11, No. 2284 ("The person who gives 
scandal becomes his neighbor's tempter."). While it is sometimes said that a scandalous act must 
have "at least the appearance of evil," 1 SLATER, supra note 50, at 198, it seems that scandal can 
arise from an act that lacks even the appearance of evil. See JONE, supra note 39, § 146 ("Actions 
good in themselves, which have not the appearance of evil, but which, nevertheless, give others 
occasion to sin, need not be omitted if the omission means great inconvenience."); 1 SLATER, 
supra note 50, at 201 ("A good action without any appearance of evil which is not prescribed, and 
which can without inconvenience be omitted, should be omitted when it would cause scandal. If it 
cannot be abandoned without some inconvenience, there is no obligation to abstain from it."), 
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maybe I'll do x as well.70 Scandal is a "special sin against the precept of 
fraternal correction which obliges us to do what we can to rescue a fallen 
brother, whereas one who scandalizes his brother causes him to fall.'>71 Sig-
nificantly, it is quite possible an action that is itself perfectly permissible 
can scandalize another. 
If I foresee that scandal is likely to be caused by an action of mine 
which has the appearance of being wrong, but which in fact is 
perfectly lawful, I am under the obligation of removing the dan-
ger of scandal by explaining my conduct, or omitting the action 
altogether if I can do so conveniently. If I cannot explain nor omit 
the action without serious inconvenience, I am justified in per-
forming the action and permitting the scandal, for charity does not 
bind to one's own serious inconvenience.72 
Cooperation is "[ c ]losely connected with scandal . . . indeed they are 
often treated of together.'>73 The distinction between the two is that scandal 
refers to "leading others into sin," while cooperation refers to being "in-
volved in the wrongdoing initiated by another."74 Someone cooperates in 
sin by facilitating or contributing to another's wrongdoing; someone scan-
dalizes another by inducing the other to sin.7s Despite this distinction, they 
are closely related, and both are aspects of charity. This connection to char-
ity reveals that the doctrine of cooperation is not, as it sometimes appears, 
preoccupied with keeping one's own hands clean, but rather concerned with 
helping one's brother or sister avoid sin.76 
ii. Double Effect 
The second aspect of Catholic moral theology to which the doctrine of 
cooperation is closely connected is the principle of double effect. That prin-
70. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 11, No. 2285 ("Scandal takes on a 
particular gravity by reason of the authority of those who cause it or the weakness of those who 
are scandalized."). See U.S. CATHOLIC BISHOPS, LNING THE GOSPEL OF LIFE: A CHALLENGE TO 
AMERICAN CATHOLICS '132 (U.S. Catholic Conf., Inc. 1998) ("We urge those Catholic officials 
who choose to depart from Church teaching on the inviolability of human life in their public life to 
consider the consequences for their own spiritual well heing, as well as the scandal they risk by 
leading others into serious sin."). 
71. 1 SLATER, supra note 50, at 198-99. 
72. Id. at 200; see also 1 DAVIS, supra note 65, at 335 ("Temporal goods, if of small mo-
ment, should he given up to avert scandal; not, however, if they are considerable, for serious 
personal loss may outweigh the duty of charity to others, except in very serious matters."). 
73. I SLATER, supra note 50, at 203 (noting, in addition, that "on account of the importance 
of the latter it seems desirable to devote a special chapter to it"). 
74. 3 GRISEZ, supra note 41, at 872. 
75. See 1 DAVIS, supra note 65, at 333 ("Scandal is not given to one who is already deter-
mined to sin; nor to one who would not at all be induced to sin by the bad example given."). 
76. Cf Tamanaha, supra note 38, at 277 (claiming that my analysis will help judges to "keep 
their hands clean"). A person deciding whether it is wrong to cooperate with the sin of another 
should not be thinking. "How can I manage to let someone else do the wrong that I want done 
without implicating myself'?" but rather, "What should I do, in light of my other moral obligations, 
to prevent someone else from doing wrong?" 
2006] CATHOLIC JUDGES AND COOPERATION IN SIN 239 
ciple provides the criteria by which to evaluate the permissibility of under-
taking an act that has an evil effect. The four requirements of that principle 
are as follows: 
1. The act itself must be good or at least morally indifferent. That 
is, the act must not be intrinsically evil. 
2. A good effect must follow from the action at least as immedi-
ately as the evil effect. This criterion is aimed at avoiding the 
conclusion that a good end justifies an evil means. 
3. The intention must be directed to the good effect exclusively. 
4. There must be sufficient, or proportionate, reason for permit-
ting the evil?7 
At the heart of the doctrine is the difference between intending evil 
and accepting evil. 78 A classic example of the principle involves the law of 
war.79 It is wrong to directly target noncombatants.8o However, one can 
attack a military target despite the knowledge that there will be noncomba-
tant casualties if the criteria of the principle of double effect are met. If the 
attack on a military target is in pursuance of a just war, it is not an intrinsi-
cally evil act. In addition, if the good military effect is not obtained by 
means of the civilian casualties, but rather the civilian casualties are collat-
eral to-a side effect of-that attack, the second criterion is met. The third 
criterion requires that those conducting the military action intend only the 
good military effect, not the noncombatant casualties. Finally, there must be 
sufficient (proportionate) reason to conclude that the evil of noncombatant 
casualties is acceptable in light of the good effect obtained. This fourth 
77. See, e.g., Edward C. Lyons, In Incognito-The Principle of Double Effect in American 
Constitutional lAw, 57 FLA. L. REv. 469, 482 (2005) (setting forth the requirements in somewhat 
different tenns). 
All moralists agree substantially on the statement of the principle, although some word 
it a little differently from others .... [I]n its full modem dress, it may be expressed as 
follows: A person may licitly perfonn an action that he foresees will produce a good and 
a bad effect provided that four conditions are verified at one and the same time: I) that 
the action in itself from its very object be good or at least indifferent; 2) that the good 
effect and not the evil effect be intended; 3) that the good effect be not produced by 
means of the evil effect; 4) that there be a proportionately grave reason for permitting 
the evil effect. 
Id. at 482 n. 48 (quoting Joseph T. Mangan, An Historical Analysis of the Principle of Double 
Effect, 10 THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 41, 42-43 (1949». 
78. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 11, No. 1737 ("An effect can be 
tolerated without being willed by its agent; for instance, a mother's exhaustion from tending her 
sick child."); see, e.g., CHRISTOPHER KUTZ, COMPLICITY; ETHICS AND LAW FOR A COLLECTIVE 
AGE 89 (2000) (referring to the "familiar difference between intending a certain result and acting 
with the knowledge that the result will obtain"). 
79. See generally John F. Coverdale, An Introduction to the Just War Tradition, 16 PACE 
OO'L L. REv. 221 (2004). 
80. Id. at 264 ("Just war theorists disagree in their assessment of where to draw the line 
between combatants and noncombatants, but they agree that the deliberate targeting of noncomba-
tants is immoral."). 
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principle provides a basis for criticizing even unintended noncombatant cas-
ualties in a just war if they are disproportionate to the military end. 
The principle of double effect similarly explains what the Catholic 
Church means when it condemns "direct" abortion but not indirect abor-
tions.s1 The point of the distinction between direct and indirect is not to 
distinguish between abortions caused by medical treatment and spontaneous 
abortions (or miscarriages). Instead, it is shorthand for the application of the 
principle of double effect. 82 For example, surgery to remove a cancerous 
uterus, is, in itself, a good act. If there is a fetus within that uterus, such an 
operation would also produce the evil effect of killing that fetus. However, 
killing the fetus is not the means by which the good effect of removing the 
cancerous uterus is reached. So long as the bad effect is not intended, and 
so long as there are proportional reasons to accept the evil, the operation is 
permissible.83 
This principle of double effect is most familiar to constitutional law-
yers from the physician-assisted suicide cases. In Vacco v. Quill, the Su-
preme Court held that "must as a State may prohibit assisting suicide while 
permitting patients to refuse unwanted lifesaving treatment, it may permit 
palliative care related to that refusal, which may have the foreseen but unin-
tended 'double effect' of hastening the patient's death."84 As Judge 
Kleinfeld put it (in a passage quoted in part by the Supreme Court): 
When General Eisenhower ordered American soldiers onto the 
beaches of Normandy, he knew that he was sending many Ameri-
can soldiers to certain death, despite his best efforts to minimize 
81. See Pope John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae, supra note 46, at No. 62 ("I declate that direct 
abortion, that is, abortion willed as an end or as a means, always constitutes a grave moral disor-
der, since it is the deliberate killing of an innocent human being."). 
82. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note II, No. 2271 ("Direct abortion, that is 
to say, abortion willed as an end or a means, is gravely contrary to the moral law."). 
83. See, e.g., JONE, supra note 39, § 14 ("Therefore, an unmatried mother may not procure 
abortion to avoid disgrace. On the other hand it is lawful for a pregnant woman to take medicine 
which is necessary for her health even though this medicine will cause an abortion."); GAL-
LAGHER, supra note 57, at 101 (noting the permissibility, under traditional double effect doctrine, 
of excising a cancerous pregnant uterus). The application of traditional double effect doctrine to 
ectopic pregnancies led some to a distinction between cutting out the fallopian tube (permissible) 
and shelling the fetus out of the fallopian tube (impermissible) that many found difficult to accept. 
See Keenan, supra note 45, at 210. 
84. 521 U.S. 793, 807 n.ll (1997) (citing New York Task Force on Life and Law, When 
Death Is Sought: Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in the Medical Context 163 (1994), available at 
http://www.health.state.ny.us/nysdohlconsumer/patientlchap8.htrn ("It is widely recognized that 
the provision of pain medication is ethically and professionally acceptable even when the treat-
ment ntay hasten the patient's death, if the medication is intended to alleviate pain and severe 
discomfort, not to cause death."»; see also Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 
(1979) (upholding the constitutionality of a veterans' preference, insisting that there is a difference 
between action taken "because of' its impact on women and one taken "in spite of' its impact on 
women); see generally Lyons, supra note 77, at 473 (arguing that the principle of double effect is 
"a valid principle of ethical deliberation" and "a pervasive, albeit generally unacknowledged, prin-
ciple employed regulatly in American case law"). 
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casualties. His purpose, though, was to liberate the beaches, liber-
ate France, and liberate Europe from the Nazis. The majority's 
theory of ethics would imply that this purpose was legally and 
ethically indistinguishable from a purpose of killing American 
soldiers. Knowledge of an undesired consequence does not imply 
that the actor intends that consequence. A physician who adminis-
ters pain medication with the purpose of relieving pain, doing his 
best to avert death, is no murderer, despite his knowledge that as 
the necessary dosage rises, it will produce the undesired conse-
quence of death. 85 
241 
So conceptually close are cooperation and double effect that some view 
the doctrine governing cooperation as basically an application of the princi-
ple of double effect. As Father Slater explained: 
It is never lawful to cooperate formally with another's sin, for it is 
obviously to wish evil, which is always sinful. Nor is it lawful to 
cooperate materially with the sin of another when the action of 
the secondary agent is itself wrong, as is also clear. But provided 
the action of the secondary agent is not itself wrong, but right, or 
at least indifferent, and he has no evil intentions, and furthermore 
there is a just cause for permitting the sin of the principal agent, 
material cooperation in the sin of another is not wrong. In such 
circumstances, the secondary agent does nothing that is wrong in 
itself; he foresees, it is true, that another will take advantage of 
his action in order to commit sin, but the secondary agent is only 
bound to prevent this out of charity, which does not bind with 
relatively serious inconvenience, and this is present whenever 
there is just cause for permitting the sin of the principal agent. 
This is merely the application of the principle of a double effect. 86 
III. DISTINGUISHING JUDICIAL DECISIONS AS CONSTITUTING FORMAL OR 
MA TERIAL COOPERATION 
With this overview of formal and material cooperation, we can begin 
to analyze judicial actions. As harsh as it may seem, the daily grist of a 
judge's work involves cooperation in sin. Acquitting a criminal defendant 
who, though guilty, was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt assists 
that defendant in committing additional crimes. Granting summary judg-
ment for a civil defendant sued for fraud because the plaintiff has no evi-
85. See Compassion in Dying v. State of Wash., 79 F.3d 790, 858 (9th Cir. 1996) (Kleinfeld, 
J., dissenting), rev'd, Wash. v. G1ucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). In his view, the majority in the 
court of appeals was "exactly wrong" in saying that there is "'little, if any, difference for constitu-
tional or ethical purposes' between providing pain killing medication for the purpose of relieving 
pain, knowing that it will at some dosage cause death, and providing medication for the sole 
purpose of causing death." Jd. 
86. 1 SLATER, supra note 50, at 203-04; see also 3 GRISEZ, supra note 41, at 873 (Hthe 
material cooperator's act, if not wrong for some other reason, is wrong if, and only if, he or she 
should not accept the bad side effects of contributing to another's wrongdoing"). 
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dence of reliance on the defendant's misrepresentations similarly assists the 
defendant to engage in future frauds. Entering a judgment for a lying plain-
tiff who is nevertheless believed by the jury assists the plaintiff in unjustly 
enriching herself at the expense of the defendant. In such circumstances, it 
would be extraordinary to even suggest that the judge was engaged in for-
mal rather than material cooperation, for formal cooperation would involve 
the judge intending the defendant to commit future crimes or frauds, or 
intending that the plaintiff recover unjustly. 
All judicial actions in a given area of the law are not the same. Across 
the broad sweep of areas where Catholic teaching and American law con-
flict-whether the issue is contraception, abortion, fornication, homosexual 
conduct, the death penalty, marriage and divorce, property, welfare, or im-
migration-careful distinctions need to be made about the precise judicial 
action involved. 
A. Capital Punishment 
John Garvey and Amy Coney Barrett have made this point powerfully 
by undertaking a detailed analysis of the cooperation question in the context 
of capital punishment. 87 They conclude that Catholic judges may not sen-
tence individuals to death, but may preside over the guilt phase of a capital 
trial, affirm a death sentence on appeal, and refuse to disturb a death sen-
tence on collateral review. 88 They explain that an appellate judge, unlike a 
sentencing judge, can rightly say that "he does not intentionally direct or 
promote the defendant's execution," and thus is not engaged in formal 
cooperation.89 
On the other hand, they contend that a judge who sentences a defen-
dant to death, whether based on a jury verdict or his own fact-finding, 
presents a "straightforward case of formal cooperation."90 They state that a 
judge who enters an order sentencing someone to death intends, even if 
reluctantly, that the defendant be put to death.91 They reason that "[o]ne 
who gives an order cannot protest that he did not intend it to be carried 
OUt."92 
They are certainly right that sentencing a defendant to death is usually 
formal cooperation in sin, and may be right that it always constitutes formal 
cooperation, but the picture is a bit more complicated.93 In an era when the 
87. Garvey & Coney [Barrett], supra note 43, at 303. 
88. Jd. at 306, 329. 
89. Jd. at 328. 
90. Jd. at 321. 
91. Jd. 
92. Jd. 
93. An additional caveat (which they of course acknowledge, see id. at 313) is that the 
Church does not foreclose all possibility of the death penalty, but rather that "as a consequence of 
the possibilities which the state has for effectively preventing crime, by rendering one who has 
committed an offense incapable of doing harm-without definitely taking away from him the 
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Catholic Church taught the widespread permissibility of capital punishment, 
it nevertheless confronted a different problem: the conviction of an innocent 
man. Aquinas taught that a judge who knows that a man, 
who has been convicted by false witnesses, is innocent, he must, 
like Daniel, examine the witnesses with great care, so as to find a 
motive for acquitting the innocent: but if he cannot do this he 
should remit him for judgment by a higher tribunal. If even this is 
impossible, he does not sin if he pronounce sentence in accor-
dance with the evidence, for it is not he that puts the innocent 
man to death, but they who stated him to be guilty.94 
In advising priests who ministered to those condemned to death, Saint 
Alphonsus-the patron saint of moral theology95-stated that the unjustly 
condemned should be urged not to hate their judges. 
possibility of redeeming himself-the cases in which the execution of the offender is an absolute 
necessity 'are very rare, if not practically non-existent.''' CATECHISM OF TIlE CATIlOLIC CHURCH, 
supra note 11, No. 2267. 
94. THOMAS AQUINAS. SUMMA THEOLOGICA, Part /I of the Second Part, q. 64 a 6 (in vol. 3 
of Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Christian Classics 1998). The context of this 
passage is that Aquinas is defending the proposition that "it is in no way lawful to slay the inno-
cent" against the objection that "sometimes a man is forced, according to the order of justice, to 
slay an innocent person: for instance, when a judge, who is bound to judge according to the 
evidence. condemns to death a man whom he knows to be innocent but who is convicted by false 
witnesses." /d. 
Aquinas evidently envisioned judges deciding cases regarding which they had personal 
knowledge obtained outside the legal proceeding. and insisted that while judges could use such 
information to "more rigorously sift the evidence brought forward, and discover its weak points," 
they must ultimately decide cases on the basis of the evidence acquired judicially. AQUINAS, 
supra, at q. 67, a. 2 (stating further that "it is the duty of a judge to pronounce judgment in as 
much as he exercises public authority, wherefore his judgment should be based on information 
acquired by him, not from his knowledge as a private individual, but from what he knows as a 
public person"); id. ("In matters touching his own person, a man must form his conscience from 
his own knowledge, but in matters concerning the public authority, he must form his conscience in 
accordance with the knowledge attainable in the public judicial procedure"). Under contemporary 
American practice, of course, a judge who has extra-judicial personal knowledge must recuse. See 
28 U.S.c. § 455(b)(I) (2000) (requiring disqualification where the judge has "personal knowledge 
of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding"). 
As horrific as we might find the notion of sentencing an innocent person to death, notice that 
Aquinas's approach may, in some instances, be more favorable to an innocent person than con-
temporary American practice considering that Aquinas would permit a judge to rely upon personal 
knowledge to "rigorously sift the evidence" and "discover its weak points." AQUINAS, supra, q. 
67, a. 2. In contrast, contemporary American practice reduces a judge's autonomy in such a 
situation to that of an ordinary witness. Moreover, much of the horror comes from the supposition 
that the judge "knows" that the defendant is innocent. If we imagine a more epistemologically 
realistic example of a judge who "thinks," or "believes," or "has good reason to conclude" that a 
defendant is innocent, then not only is the horror reduced, but we also must acknowledge that 
judges in the United States are not empowered to acquit defendants in a jury trial on this basis if a 
reasonable jury could properly fmd guilt. See FED. R. CRlM. P. 29; Jackson v. Va., 443 U.S. 307 
(1979). 
95. See Catholic.org, S1. Alphonsus, http://www.catholic.org!saints/saint.php?sainUd=256 
(last visited Mar. 21, 2007). 
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If those who are condemned insist that they are unwilling to par-
don the judges who have unjustly condemned them, endeavor to 
convince them that the judges are obliged to mete out justice and 
to pronounce sentence according to the evidence given in the trial. 
So it is not fair to hate them.96 
As Father Slater summarized the matter in 1908: 
The judge . . . must pass sentence according to the evidence 
before the court, not according to his own private knowledge or 
views. He may know privately that an accused man is guilty, but 
he must not condemn him unless his guilt has been proved by the 
evidence. But what if the judge knows for certain that an accused 
man is innocent, and yet according to the evidence available he 
has been proved gUilty? In such a case as this the judge must, of 
course, use all the means in his power to bring out the innocence 
of the accused party, or remit the case to another court. But sup-
posing that he has done all in his power to avoid condemning the 
innocent man, and nevertheless the jury have found him guilty, 
and by law it only remains for the judge to pass sentence accord-
ing to the verdict. Is he allowed to do so? This question was dis-
puted among theologians. Some with St. Thomas taught that he 
might condemn the innocent man, for the witnesses were then 
guilty of injustice, not the judge, who did his duty in passing sen-
tence according to law. Others denied that this is lawful, for to 
condemn the innocent, especially if there is a question of a death 
sentence, is intrinsically wrong. Others distinguished, and taught 
that it is indeed unlawful to condemn an innocent man to death 
even when by judicial process, he has been proved to all appear-
ances guilty, but that when there is a question of a fine or impris-
onment which may be suffered without sin the judge may pass 
sentence according to law, for this is for the public good. Practi-
cally, therefore, according to the principles of English jurispru-
dence, the judge may lawfully pass sentence even of death in such 
a case, but he is bound afterward by making representations to the 
proper authority to do what he can to clear the innocent party.97 
Thus there is substantial authority in Catholic moral theology to con-
clude that a judge who believes someone to be innocent, but nevertheless 
convicts him in accordance with the law, is not necessarily engaged in for-
mal cooperation with sin. By analogy, a judge who sentences someone to 
96. LIGOURJ, supra note 61, at 335; see also John T. Noonan, Jr., Abortion and the Catholic 
Church: A Summary History, 12 NAT. L. FORUM 85, 108 (1967) (describing Alphonsus Liguori's 
work as a "masterly summation of the work of the casuists"). 
97. 1 SLATER, supra note 50, at 585-86; see also John D. Davis, The Moral Obligations of 
Catholic Civil Judges, 69-71 (1953) (doctoral dissertation, Cath. Univ. of Am.) (describing the 
competing and permissible strands of thought on this question); cf id. at 127-28 (noting statement 
of Pope Pius XII that in some circumstances a judge "may inflict a penalty for transgression of an 
unjust law," but not "in the case of condemnation to death"). 
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death in accordance with the law is not necessarily engaged in fonnal coop-
eration with sin. 
Moreover, there is a substantial basis for concluding that it is possible 
for a judge to enter an order while not intending that it be carried out. That 
is an apt description of a judge who does what Slater recommended: pass 
sentence but afterward make representations to the proper authority in an 
attempt to clear the innocent defendant.98 
It is important to note that my disagreement with Dean Garvey and 
Professor Barrett is rather narrow. I do not take the strong position that 
imposing a death sentence is not fonnal cooperation, but rather only that 
there is a substantial basis for concluding that it is not.99 
In commenting on this article, Professor Barrett emphasized that a 
death sentence is an order, not a recommendation, and that a judge who 
enters such an order is ordering someone in the executive branch to execute 
the defendant. This position, however, may rely too heavily on the fonn of 
a judgment of sentence of death. That is, although a death sentence takes 
the fonn of an order to the executive, the executive is generally free to 
decline to enforce that order without the risk of contempt. This is certainly 
true in the federal system, where the President has the power of pardon and 
clemency.loo So understood, a judgment of sentence of death is less com-
98. For example, Judge Charles R. McGrath asked Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger to 
grant clemency to a man whom McGrath had sentenced to death. See Henry Weinstein, Judge 
Requests Clemency for a Killer He Condemned, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2006, at Ai. Judge Mc-
Grath's reason for advising clemency, however, is information that came to light after the judg-
ment was entered. Id. The Committee on Codes of Conduct advises federal judges that 
a personal recommendation for Presidential commutation of sentence or pardon . . . in 
response to a prisoner's request [is] normally inadvisable ... [b]ecause recommenda-
tions sought as personal favors would be addressed to the Justice Department, and ... 
that Department is a frequent litigant before federal judges, [thus] the potential exists 
that undue influence would be felt. 
65 Op. Comm. on Codes of Conduct (Aug. 25, 1980), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/guide/ 
vol2l65.html. The Committee specifically noted, however, that its advice "does not relate to a 
judge's transmission (without recommendation) of objective information which the Justice De-
partment may not have and which would assist it in making its determination." Id. 
99. By staying close to Aquinas, Saint Alphonsus, and traditional manuals of moral theology, 
this approach hardly runs the risk of proportionalism. Cf Charles E. Curran, Cooperation: Toward 
a Revision of the Concept and its Application, 41 LINACRE Q. 152, 156-57 (Aug. 1974) (noting 
that Alphonsus "presents the framework within which cooperation has been discussed in Roman 
Catholic theology to the present time" but suggesting a revision to that traditional framework). 
100. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (giving President the power to "grant Reprieves and Par-
dons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment"); see also Biddle v. 
Perovich, 274 U.S. 480, 487-88 (1927) (upholding power of President to commute sentence of 
death to life imprisonment without the consent of the convict); Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 
279-80 (1974) (upholding power of President to commute sentence of death to life imprisonment 
without parole even though life imprisonment without parole was not a legislatively authorized 
punishment for the offense). The power of the executive in some jurisdictions is more limited. 
See, e.g., TEX. CONST. art. IV, § l1(b) ("In all criminal cases, except treason and impeachment, 
the Governor shall have power, after conviction, on the written signed recommendation and ad-
vice of the Board of Pardons and Paroles, or a majority thereof, to grant reprieves and commuta-
tions of punishment and pardons."). 
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mand and more permission; not so much commanding that the executive 
kill as adjudicating that the law permits the executive to kill. In the terms 
preferred by Professor Barrett, such a judge adopts the proposal to "enter 
judgment that, in accordance with the law, the executive is empowered to 
execute the defendant.'>lOI 
B. Marriage and Divorce 
Similar questions regarding judicial cooperation also arose in the past 
in the context of marriage and divorce.102 Presiding over a civil marriage is 
neither intrinsically wrong nor formal cooperation in sinful actions of the 
couple. 
As a civil official a Catholic may without further ado co-operate 
in a civil marriage if the parties are willing to be married before 
the Church after the civil ceremony. A grave reason is required 
for such co-operation if he is certain that they will not be married 
subsequently in the Church. Some authors even think he may co-
operate for an extremely grave reason when there is an indispen-
sable impediment, e.g., marriage bond. 103 
In other words, presiding over a civil marriage-even when it was 
clear that the couple would engage in what the Church considers fornication 
or adultery-is not formal cooperation in those sins. 
Father Slater, writing in 1908, observed that "[a] judge, who is merely 
the mouthpiece of the legislator and administers law ready made, may often 
co-operate in administering an unjust law, for otherwise he would have to 
resign his office."104 He explained that while a judge could not give "judg-
ment for divorce ... and openly declarer ] that he did so, in order that the 
parties or party might remarry," he could, for a grave reason, "pronounce 
sentence of divorce in accordance with law."105 Father Jone later taught that 
101. Viewed in this light, the sentencing judge is analogous to the appellate judge: both are 
deciding whether another juridical person, under the law, has the authority to take particular ac-
tion. Cf. Garvey & Coney [Barrett], supra note 43, at 328 ("To affirm the sentence is not to 
approve it, but to say that the trial court did its job. What the court of appeals really decides is that 
the responsibility for life and death lies somewhere else."). 
102. See generally Davis, supra note 97, at 167-201 (discussing the various aspects of the 
Church's teaching on marriage and divorce, and the responsibilities of Catholic judges in a wide 
range of divorce cases). 
103. JONE, supra note 39, § 660. 
104. I DAVIS, supra note 65, at 349 (noting that in "the case of Catholics who are obliged to 
contribute to undenominational schools as well as to build their own-the subject who suffers 
injustice is willing to suffer to avoid a greater evil"), 
105. [d. at 349-50 (noting that "[a] judge who urges a woman to give her adulterous husband 
his freedom to re-marry is urging what is wrong"). Davis stated that a civil sentence of divorce did 
not mean a "divorce a vinculo--a matter with which the civil law does not concern itself-but 
means that no action for bigamy will arise if the parties re-marry." [d. Given his acknowledgment 
that a civil divorce would permit the parties to remarry civilly, it appears that Davis was not 
addressing the civil law distinction between divorce a vinculo and divorce a mensa et thoro, but 
rather asserting that a civil law divorce would not, in the Church's eyes, dissolve the marriage. 
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"[aJ Catholic magistrate who by reason of his office must accept a divorce 
case may, according to a probable opinion, co-operate in granting the di-
vorce, since he may consider the divorce a mere civil formality like civil 
marriage itself."I06 So understood, granting a civil divorce is not formal 
cooperation in sin.107 Pope John Paul II reflected this same understanding 
when, in an address to the Roman Rota, he stated: 
[PJrofessionals in the field of civil law should avoid being person-
ally involved in anything that might imply a cooperation with di-
vorce. For judges this may prove difficult, since the legal order 
does not recognize a conscientious objection to exempt them from 
giving sentence. 
For grave and proportionate motives they may therefore act in 
accord with the traditional principles of material cooperation. 108 
This does not mean that there is no imaginable judicial action concern-
ing marriage and divorce that would constitute formal cooperation.109 To 
use Father Slater's example, a judge who gave a judgment for divorce pre-
cisely in order to enable the party to remarry would be engaged in formal 
cooperation. Similarly, Father Jone taught that a judge may never order 
See also Davis, supra note 97, at 125 (quoting Pope Pius xn as stating that a judge "can in 
no case expressly recognize and approve an unjust law," and therefore "cannot pronounce a penal 
judgment which would be equivalent to such approval"); id. at 126-27 (explaining that a "judge 
can never say or do anything which would indicate his personal approval or favor of the unjust 
law," that "not every application of an unjust law necessarily means its recognition and approval," 
and that Pius is "appl[yingj the moral principles of cooperation"). 
106. JONE, supra note 39, § 766. 
107. Professor Tamanaha complains that this analysis fails to acknowledge that an order grant-
ing a divorce is a performative act. Tamanaha, supra note 38, at 275. It does nothing of the kind. I 
agree a civil judge issuing an order of divorce has ended the civil marriage. The point is that such 
an order, while it dissolves the marriage for purposes of the civil law, does not dissolve the 
marriage as the Church understands marriage. That is, as far as the Church is concerned. the 
couple remains married. See CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 11, No. 1640 
("Thus the marriage bond has been established by God himself in such a way that a marriage 
concluded and consummated between baptized persons can never be dissolved. This bond, which 
results from the free human act of the spouses and their consummation of the marriage, is a 
reality. henceforth irrevocable."); see also Davis, supra note 97, at 188 (explaining that a Catholic 
judge. in granting a divorce. need not be engaged in formal cooperation because all he is doing is 
declaring "that in the eyes of the state the persons are no longer considered husband and wife" 
while knowing that "he breaks not the real bond but only the civil bond"). 
If it seems odd to imagine that someone is married for purposes of one body of law, but not 
married for purposes of another body of law, consider that this is precisely the situation of married 
gay couples in Massachusetts. They are married as a matter of Massachusetts law, but not married 
as a matter of federal law. See I U.S.c. § 7 (1996) ("In determining the meaning of any Act of 
Congress, or of any ruling. regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and 
agencies of the United States, the word 'marriage' means only a legal union between one man and 
one woman as husband and wife."). 
108. Pope John Paul II, Address to the Roman Rota (Jan. 28, 2002) (emphasis omitted). 
109. I DAvrs, supra note 65, at 349 (noting that in "the case of Catholics who are obliged to 
contribute to undenominational schools as well as to build their own-the subject who suffers 
injustice is willing to suffer to avoid a greater evil"). 
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someone "to live conjugally with a person to whom one is not married 
before God."llo 
C. Abortion 
A detailed analysis is appropriate even in the extraordinary context of 
abortion, for all judicial decisions involving abortion are not the same in 
terms of cooperation. And even the very same outward judicial behavior 
may constitute formal or material cooperation, depending on what the judge 
intends. 111 
Consider an extreme case: An assistant United States Attorney files a 
criminal complaint against a Planned Parenthood clinic for performing first 
trimester abortions. There is, however, no federal statute prohibiting first 
trimester abortions. Moreover, it has long been established that there is no 
federal common law of crimes. 112 Although dismissing the complaint cer-
tainly makes it easier for Planned Parenthood to continue performing abor-
tions, the judge who does so is not necessarily formally cooperating in sin. 
His action of dismissing the complaint is, in itself, not intrinsically evil. He 
can take that action without intending that Planned Parenthood perform 
abortions. The judge would be gUilty of formal cooperation if he dismissed 
the case, not simply because he intended to decide the case in accordance 
with the law, but because he intended that the defendant perform direct 
abortions. But there is no reason to infer this intent from the mere dismissal 
of the complaint. 
Next, consider a case in which Congress has passed a law prohibiting 
all abortions and a criminal prosecution is brought under that statute. Even 
putting Roe ll3 and Casey 11 4 aside, the case would present the legal question 
whether Congress has the power, under the Commerce Clause or Section 5 
of the Fourteenth Amendment,115 to enact such legislation. If a judge were 
to decide that Congress lacked such constitutional power, it would no more 
necessarily constitute formal cooperation than the first example. While the 
legal questions would be more difficult than in the first example, the moral 
question of whether a decision for the defendant involved formal coopera-
110. JONE, supra note 38, § 154; see also Davis, supra note 97, at 122 (quoting Pope Pius XII, 
Address to Union of Italian Catholic Jurists (Dec. 22, 1949) (stating that a "judge may never by 
his decision oblige anyone to commit an act intrinsically immoral"); id. at 123 (stating that a judge 
"can never by a decision oblige a person to deny the existence of God, to blaspheme God, or to 
take the life of an innocent person, or command that eugenic sterilization be inflicted on another"). 
111. See 3 GRISEZ, supra note 41, at 874 (distinguishing between a police officer who pre-
vents pro-life workers from talking to women approaching abortion clinics because he wants wo-
men to have abortions and a police officer who does the same thing because she does not want to 
lose her job by refusing the assignment). 
112. United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. 32 (1812). 
113. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
114. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
115. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
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tion would not be. Precisely the same analysis would apply. Now, imagine a 
case in which a state statute prohibits all abortions, but the state constitution 
expressly protects a right to have an abortion within the first twelve weeks 
of gestation. Planned Parenthood brings an action seeking an injunction 
against enforcement of that statute. Is a judge who issues the injunction 
formally cooperating in evil? Again, the answer is not necessarily. Issuing 
an injunction against enforcement of an unconstitutional law is not intrinsi-
cally evil. And a judge who issues such an injunction need not intend that 
Planned Parenthood perform any abortions. 
How about the cases that confront lower court judges today under Roe 
and Casey? A state legislature enacts a statute prohibiting abortions under 
some circumstances. Planned Parenthood brings an action seeking an in-
junction against enforcement of the statute. In some such cases-ones 
clearly governed by binding precedent-the legal questions will be easy. In 
other cases, the legal questions will not be easy. But whether the law is 
clear or not, a decision that the law is unconstitutional is, as we have seen, 
not necessarily formal cooperation in evil. The source of the legal rule 
(whether the Federal Constitution, a state constitution, or the simple ab-
sence of any legal prohibition) and the clarity of the legal rule do not affect 
the moral distinction between formal and material cooperation. 
The same principle obtains at the Supreme Court: While the freedom 
that the Supreme Court has to overrule its own prior precedent makes the 
legal questions more difficult, it does not alter the conclusion that finding a 
law unconstitutional does not necessarily constitute formal cooperation in 
the evil that the law sought to avoid. More generally, a judicial decision 
that determines the legal allocation of power is not necessarily formal coop-
eration in the sins of those to whom the law allocates the power.116 
On the other hand, there are judicial determinations regarding abortion 
that do constitute formal cooperation.117 Consider the judicial bypass sys-
tem that the Supreme Court has insisted must be made available for minors 
who seek an abortion and do not want to comply with a statute requiring 
parental consent. 118 In that system, the minor can obtain an abortion if she 
either convinces the judge that she is mature enough to make the decision 
on her own or, failing to convince the judge of her maturity, the judge 
concludes that an abortion without parental consent would be in her best 
116. See Gerald V. Bradley, Natural Law, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT 
290 (Michael W. McConnell, Robert F. Cochran, Jr., & Angela C. Carmella eds., 2001) (noting 
that Justice Scalia interprets the United States Constitution to allow states to either prohibit or 
permit abortion and stating, "[t]hat some states would use their authority under the Constitution to 
enact unjust abortion laws does not necessarily indicate that Justice Scalia intends that they do 
so."). 
117, Cf Davis, supra note 97, at 147 (arguing that a judge who "command[s] that a eugenic 
sterilization be performed [is] a formal cooperator in commanding an intrinsically evil action"). 
118. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 651 (1979). 
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interests. 119 States have established similar bypass provisions in statutes re-
quiring parental notification as well. 120 
In the first circumstance, although the judge is obviously providing 
important assistance to the girl, the judge need not intend that the abortion 
take place. Indeed, such a judge may no more intend that the abortion take 
place than does a priest from whom the same girl sought advice in confes-
sion; both judge and priest acknowledge they have no legal authority to stop 
her from acting. 
However, in the second circumstance, for a judge to conclude that an 
abortion would be in the girl's best interest and issue an order bypassing 
parental notification or consent, the judge would have to intend that the 
abortion take place. This conclusion is straightforward if one believes that a 
judge must intend that his orders be carried out. Yet even if one believes 
that a judge does not necessarily intend that his order be carried out,121 a 
determination that an abortion is in someone's best interests constitutes a 
decision that an abortion should take place. 
Some might object that the judge does not actually order that an abor-
tion take place, in that the girl is free to change her mind even after ob-
taining the order. Indeed, some might say that all the judge is doing is 
waiving the requirement of parental notification or consent, thereby permit-
ting the girl to make the decision herself. 122 The problem with this approach 
is that the very premise of the second situation is that the girl is not suffi-
ciently mature to make the decision herself. For a judge to (1) conclude that 
a girl is insufficiently mature to make the decision herself; (2) conclude that 
parental involvement is not in her best interests; (3) authorize her to consent 
to an abortion; but not (4) decide whether an abortion is in her best inter-
ests, would be to simply abandon a girl to make a decision that she is not 
mature enough to make. It is far more reasonable to conclude that "a judi-
cial bypass procedure requiring a minor to show that parental notification is 
not in her best interests is equivalent to a judicial bypass procedure requir-
119. [d. at 643-44. 
120. See, e.g., Ohio v. Akron Coc. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990) (upholding a 
judicial bypass mechanism that complied with Bellotti in the context of parental notification, with-
out deciding whether bypass for parental notification is constitutionally required); see also Ayotte 
v. Planned Parenthood of New England, 126 S.Ct. 961, 966 n.1 (2006) (noting that "[f]orty-four 
States, including New Hampshire, have parental involvement (that is, consent or notification) 
laws"). 
121. See supra Part II. 
122. Some form orders seem to suggest that all a judge need do is find that the notification 
would not be in the girl's best interests, and order that the girl be authorized to consent to the 
abortion. See, e.g., Judgment and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Application in 
Parental Notification Proceedings (Form 20), available at http://www.janesdueprocess.orgllegaC 
process/form_2d.pdf (Texas); Order GrantinglDenying Waiver of Parental Consent for an Abor-
tion, available at http://www.courts.michigan.gov/SCAO/courtforms/abortionwaiver/awindex.him 
(select "Order GrantinglDenying Waiver of Parental Consent for an Abortion") (Michigan). 
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ing a minor to show that abortion without notification is in her best 
interests." 123 
So understood, in this second circumstance, a judge would, in the vast 
majority of cases, be formally cooperating with sin.124 
IV. DETERMINING THE PERMISSIBILITY OF MATERIAL COOPERATION 
BY JUDGES 
Of course, simply because a judicial decision does not constitute formal 
cooperation in sin hardly makes it morally permissible. Material coopera-
tion in sin is sometimes permissible, but not always. Moreover, while the 
"cases to which this doctrine may be applied are very numerous," their 
safe application is difficult and attended with risk. The chief diffi-
culty lies in determining the gravity of the cause which will jus-
tify one in cooperating materially in another's sin. No general rule 
can be laid down on the point beyond saying that a graver cause is 
required when there is a question of a graver sin, when the coop-
eration is more proximate, and when it is more probable that the 
sin would not be committed at all if the cooperation were 
denied. 125 
Many factors are relevant to determining the legitimacy of material 
cooperation: 
the spiritual character and needs of another, our relations to him, 
what and how great is his offense against God, the harm that may 
accrue to a third person, the public harm likely to ensue, how 
close the co-operation, how indispensable it may be. . . . Great 
varieties of opinion, therefore, on any given case except the most 
obvious, are inevitable, and there is no more difficult question 
than this in the whole range of Moral Theology.126 
In addition, proximity can be sliced rather thin, with distinctions drawn 
between immediate, mediate, proximate, and remote material coopera-
123. Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292, 297 (1997) (per curiam). The concurring Justices in 
Wicklund, however, thought that the plain language of the statute involved in that case "makes it 
passably clear that a showing that notification is not in the minor's best interest is alone suffi-
cient," without expressing any concern that this construction abandons the girl to make a decision 
that she is immature to make. Id. at 302 (Stevens, J., joined by Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., concur-
ring in the judgment); see also Teresa Stanton Collett, Seeking Solomon's Wisdom: Judicial By-
pass of Parental Involvement in a Minor's Abortion Decision, 52 BAYLOR L. REv. 513, 579 
(2000) (noting that for a court to inquire only whether parental notification is in the girl's best 
interests, but not decide whether the abortion is in her best interests is to "irresponsibly desert the 
immature minor to make a decision the court has already determined she is ill-equipped to 
make"). 
124. The reason for the qualification is that the Catholic Church teaches, pursuant to the prin-
ciple of double effect, that indirect abortions may be permissible. 
125. 1 SLATER, supra note 50, at 204. 
126. 1 DAVIS, supra note 65, at 342. 
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tion. 127 To illustrate: helping a burglar to empty the jewels that he is steal-
ing into his bag is immediate material cooperation, holding the ladder for 
the burglar to climb up to a window is proximate material cooperation, 
while purchasing tools for a burglar is remote material cooperation. 128 
A. Material Cooperation in Other Walks of Life 
Before turning to the particular situation of judges, consideration of 
particular cases involving people from a wide range of walks of life helps 
both to flesh out the idea and provide context. Because the casuistic genre 
of the manuals has largely died, however, many of the cases are rather 
archaic. In some circumstances, the archaicness may seem quaint; in other 
circumstances, it may be offensive, particularly because the manuals were 
written prior to the Church's recognition of religious liberty. One of them, 
however, seems ripped from the current headlines: "Clerks in a drug store 
may never advise customers in the purchase of contraceptives, but to keep 
their positions they may sell these things to those that ask for them."129 
Architects may design a building for non-Catholic worship for a "very 
good reason," while "a lesser reason justifies the ordinary laborer to work 
on such buHdings."13o Moreover, legislators "may vote public funds for the 
erection of a Protestant church if it be in the interest of religious har-
mony."131 While it is not permissible to print, publish, or edit publications 
inimical to faith or morals, linotyping or proofreading is permissible proxi-
mate cooperation if one cannot otherwise make a living. Actions such as 
preparing and feeding the paper, mixing the ink, and operating the presses 
are permissible for a "moderately grave" reason. Remote cooperation, such 
as selling ink, paper, and machinery to such printing establishments is per-
missible for the sake of profit. 132 
Where immoral shows and dances are concerned, the musicians need 
some weighty reason to cooperate, while those that keep the theater or hall 
in repair cooperate only remotely and need a less weighty reason. Police-
men who must be present on duty are excused. How strong a reason an 
owner of property needs to rent property for such purposes depends on 
whether other locations are readily available. 133 
127. See JONE, supra note 38, § 147; 1 DAVIS, supra note 65, at 341-42; cf. 3 GRISEZ, supra 
note 41, at 890 (noting that his analysis departs from Alphonsus and the manualists "mainly in 
regard to the moral significance of proximity~that is, of how closely the cooperator's outward 
behavior involves him or her in the wrongdoer's outward behavior carrying out his or her bad 
choice," but that this difference is not all that great because "closeness of involvement correlates 
more or less well with many of the factors affecting the strength of reasons not to cooperate"). 
128. 1 DAVIS, supra note 65, at 341-42. 
129. JONE, supra note 39, § 152. 
130. Id. § 148. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. §§ 148-150. 
133. Id. § 151. 
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Domestics may prepare meat on a day of abstinence for an employer, 
and serve alcohol despite knowing that the employer will become intoxi-
cated. Similarly, employees may procure immoral books for employers. 
Taxi drivers can bring passengers to houses of ill-repute, because, "on the 
one hand, they cannot hinder sin anyway, and, on the other, their refusal 
would mean considerable loss to themselves."134 A workman may, for very 
serious need, manufacture Masonic emblems, since the emblems are, in 
themselves, indifferent. 135 
In selling things that can be used for good or ill, if the buyer's inten-
tion is manifestly sinful, the sale is permissible only if there is some grave 
inconvenience in refusing to sell, apart from the loss of profit. Where a 
buyer's intention is not manifestly sinful, and the product is ordinarily used 
for sinful purposes, the seller should assure himself that the object will not 
be put to a bad use, if he can do so without grave inconvenience. However, 
a "serious loss of custom would excuse the seller both from making inquir-
ies and refusal to sell in this case."136 Finally, for those very few things that 
have only a sinful use, formal cooperation is usually present. 137 Yet even 
here, 
we must be on our guard not to exaggerate, for if the purchaser 
can easily get the article elsewhere, and if he is quite determined 
to use it, the seller may refuse to associate himself with the inten-
tion of the purchaser, and since the sale is material co-operation-
though it may be proximate on occasions-a very serious reason 
would justify the seller in not preventing the sin of another, for 
this obligation is one of charity, and the seller has also the duty of 
charity to himself.138 
134. [d. § 152; see also 1 DAVIS, supra note 65, at 348-49: 
There are many ways in which a servant is asked to cooperate and render assistance to 
masters or mistresses when these sin. It will always be advisable and sometimes obliga-
tory to try to find another occupation. But, meanwhile, the general principles of remote 
and proximate co-operation may be applied. In no case may the servant wish the sin, and 
in no case may the servant do what is, in itself, sinful. But most cases of their co-
operation are only remotely materiaL In those cases which are exceedingly proximate, 
and in those which inflict harm on a third party, only the gravest cause would excuse. In 
no case would it be permissible for a servant to seek a prostitute for the master, and 
declare the purpose of the invitation, nor compose letters to that effect. But to issue the 
invitation verbally or by letter, without expressing the purpose, would be defensible, 
since this action is, in itself, not an evil act, nor does it necessarily imply an evil pur-
pose. A very grave cause would excuse. 
135. 1 DAVIS, supra note 65, at 346. 
136. [d. at 347. 
137. [d. at 346 (noting that it is "usually sinful to sell" such items, "for co-operation in the evil 
intention of the buyer is present. It is absurd to say that one's intentions are good, that sale is only 
for profit, that it is no concern of ours what the buyer is going to do with the articles bought. The 
very sale of an article that has only a sinful use makes sin possible."); cf id. at 348 (stating that a 
wife can ask for intercourse even if her husband habitually withdraws because the intercourse is 
"normal and legitimate at its inception" but cannot do so if he uses contraceptive instruments 
because such intercourse is "always wrong from its inception"). 
138. [d. at 346. Although Davis is less than pellucid here, it appears that he views it as possi-
ble even in these circumstances for the seller to dissociate himself from the buyer's intention, 
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Where sinful surgery is concerned, material cooperation-sterilizing 
or setting out the instruments, preparing the patient for operation, or even 
administering an anesthetic or keeping the patient quiet during an opera-
tion-is permitted for a very serious reason. "These actions are all indiffer-
ent morally, and all of them cases of material co-operation. But a graver 
excusing cause would be required where the co-operation is more 
proximate."139 
A major concern in material cooperation is avoiding scandal. For ex-
ample, in the context of selling things that have only a sinful use, "if there 
should be general scandal were it known that Catholics sold such things, for 
that reason that sale should be discontinued."I40 Similarly, in the context of 
sinful operations, 
[s)candal should be precluded, and it is normally easy to preclude 
it by letting others know that such co-operation does not imply 
approval of the operation, but that if they cannot be prevented, 
and if they will be performed in any case, the co-operation is al-
lowed, if there is a grave reason for co-operating.141 
B. Material Cooperation by Judges 
As we have already seen, a judge "may often co-operate in administer-
ing an unjust law."142 As that statement suggests, and as the following dem-
onstrates, Catholic moral theology has traditionally permitted considerable 
material cooperation in sin by judges. Although some theologians main-
tained that a Catholic judge could not apply an unjust law, even one that 
imposed a fine or imprisonment, others held that 
for grave reasons, as for example, if no Catholic could otherwise 
accept the office of judge, sentence may be passed according to 
such a law. The person injustly condemned must patiently submit 
for the public good, especially as he would not escape even if 
Catholic judges refused to execute the law. 143 
thereby making the cooperation material rather than formal. See also 3 GRISEZ, supra note 41, at 
890 (noting the division among manualists regarding immediate cooperation and that "part of the 
grave injustice of the suffering and death imposed on Jesus was parading him as a criminal to 
Calvary, and he cooperated in that injustice by carrying his cross-immediate material coopera-
tion in a grave injustice."). 
139. I DAVIS, supra note 65, at 347-48. 
140. Id. at 346, 347 n. I (Noting, evidently on the grounds of scandal, that "no chemist may 
stock contraceptives or abortifacients, nor may he sell them as agent for a firm. Female pills are 
abortifacients. being violent purgatives. The case is perhaps different for an assistant. Most au-
thors, however, condemn the sale of contraceptives even by an assistant, on the ground, we be-
lieve, of co-operation. Some permit the sale by an assistant for a very urgent reason, scandal apart, 
if the articles can be got elsewhere."). 
141. Id. at 348. 
142. Id. at 349. 
143. 1 SLATER, supra note 50, at 587-88. 
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Indeed, in the era when capital punishment was more generally permitted 
by Catholic teaching, a major distinction drawn regarding such cooperation 
was between capital cases and other cases. 
A judge may inflict a penalty on the transgressor of an unjust law 
if there is a question of only a slight punishment and there is no 
prospect of the law's being repealed by concerted resistance on 
the part of the better citizens. In such a case the condemned can-
not reasonably object to the sentence; this is especially applicable 
if the common good demands that a good judge remain in office. 
But a judge may never in such a case deprive a criminal of an 
inalienable right or possession, e.g., his life. l44 
We have already seen Garvey and Barrett's conclusion that-in light 
of current teaching regarding capital punishment-Catholic judges may not 
sentence individuals to death, but may preside over the guilt phase of a 
capital trial, affirm a death sentence on appeal, and refuse to disturb a death 
sentence on collateral review. 145 They fmd the material cooperation in-
volved in the latter set of situations to be permissible.146 We have also seen 
some reason to question their conclusion, however, that imposing a sen-
tence of death is itself formal cooperation. 147 Yet even if sentencing some-
one to death is only material cooperation, it is rather closely involved with a 
grave harm-the actual execution-and would be impermissible absent 
rather strong reasons to accept the death as a side effect. One possible rea-
son might be if there were a serious risk that the refusal of Catholic judges 
to hear capital sentencing proceedings would skew those proceedings to-
ward death sentences. If, in a particular jurisdiction, that result were likely, 
such material cooperation may be permissible; otherwise, Garvey and Bar-
rett's bottom line conclusion that Catholic judges should not impose 
sentences of death appears correct. 
In evaluating the permissibility of the range of material cooperation in 
abortion by judges discussed above, the gravity of the wrong is an impor-
tant factor suggesting the wrongfulness of the cooperation. On the other 
hand, in all but the judicial bypass situation, the judicial action is remote 
from the underlying wrong. Moreover, in all but the judicial bypass situa-
tion, it is not clear how much the judicial decision will, in fact, contribute to 
the underlying wrong. It also seems unlikely that judicial decisions contrib-
ute significantly to the obstinance of abortion providers. In addition, it is an 
important and good thing for judges to decide cases, including constitu-
tional cases, according to law. 
Significantly, there is little likelihood that a Catholic judge's refusal to 
handle such abortion cases will actually prevent the underlying wrong: if 
144. JONE, supra note 39, § 154. 
145. See supra Pan lILA; Garvey & Coney [Barrett], supra note 43, at 306, 309. 
146. Garvey & Coney [Barrett], supra note 43, at 306, 309. 
147. See infra Pan IDA 
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they refuse, different judges will be brought in to decide the cases in accor-
dance with the law. As with taxi drivers bringing johns to houses of prosti-
tution (or indeed, taxi drivers bringing women to abortion clinics), if one 
refuses, another will be found to do it. Worse, if Catholic judges refuse to 
hear abortion cases because of the risk of material cooperation, their legal 
perspective on such issues will be lost to the courtS.148 Losing the legal 
perspective of Catholic judges-including Chief Justice Roberts and Jus-
tices Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy, and Alito-is hardly likely to reduce the 
incidence of direct abortion. I49 (The possibility of one-way recusal is dis-
cussed below.)ISO 
There is some risk of harm to the judge from repeated material cooper-
ation. ISI But the vast majority of judges will handle few abortion cases, 
certainly in comparison to the other cases they handle, making it unlikely 
that these cases pose any particular problem to the judge over the long run. 
If a particular judge, for some reason, hears a large number or high propor-
tion of abortion cases, this might be of some concern. Again, the most 
148. Cf I SLATER, supra note 50, at 587-88, noting the teaching that 
for grave reasons, as for example, if no Catholic could otherwise accept the office of 
judge, sentence may be passed according to such a law. The person unjustly condemned 
must patiently submit for the public good, especially as he would not escape even if 
Catholic judges refused to execute the law. 
149. See Keenan, supra note 45, at 209 (noting that in certain cases of cooperation, including 
that of judges, considerations include the "possible harmful effects on the common good should 
the person refrain from acting"). Thus the doctrine of cooperation does not "shunt[ ] to the back-
ground" everything but the individual making the decision; see Tamanaha, supra note 38, at 276 
12. 
ISO. See infra Part V. 
151. See 3 GRISEZ, supra note 41, at 879-80. The harm referred to here includes such things 
as insensitivity to injustice, diminished solidarity for the victims of injustice, and the loss of ability 
to offer credible witness against wrongdoing. [d. Thus it is not some narrow self-interest (unless 
one thinks that doing the right thing for the sake of one's soul constitutes narrow self-interest). 
Indeed, concerns about repeated material cooperation with evil may offer some insight into 
Justice Blackmun's ultimate refusal to "tinker with the machinery of death." See Callins v. Col-
lins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
From this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of death. For more 
than 20 years I have endeavored-indeed, I have struggled-along with a majority of 
this Court, to develop procedural and substantive rules that would lend more than the 
mere appearance of fairness to the death penalty endeavor .... I feel morally and intel-
lectually obligated simply to concede that the death penalty experiment has failed. 
But see Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 922-23 (1992) (Blackmun J., 
concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("All that remained between the promise of Roe and the 
darkness ... was a single, flickering flame. . .. I fear for the darkness as four Justices anxiously 
await the single vote necessary to extinguish the light."). 
Perhaps ironically, the risk of repeated material cooperation may be greatest at the Supreme 
Court, given the frequency of applications for stays in capital cases presented to circuit justices 
and referred to the full Court. See generally ROBERT L. SmRN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 
798-808 (8th ed. 2002); Kate Coscarelli, Alita: The Ufe and Times of a Justice in the Making, 
THE STAR-LEDGER, Aug. 27, 2006 (quoting Justice Alito as noting that "One of the unpleasant 
parts of this job is that on a typical week there is at least one execution someplace."); see also 
Antonin Scalia, God's Justice and OUrs, FIRST THINGS, May 2002, available at http://www.first 
things.comlarticle.php3?id_article=2022 (stating that if he agreed with the Church's current teach-
ing on capital punishment he would have to resign). 
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likely sort of case where this might be a problem is the judicial bypass case: 
depending on the jurisdiction, a judge might be assigned a large enough 
number (or percentage of workload) of such cases that this presents a seri-
ous concern. Moreover, if there are a number of other areas of significant 
material cooperation, a judge should be alert to the cumulative effect. 
As noted above, a major concern regarding material cooperation is the 
risk of scandal. When Catholic judges find laws that prohibit or limit abor-
tion unconstitutional, they can scandalize others. 
Sometimes the fact that "good" people are involved makes 
wrongdoing seem not so wrong and provides material for ratio-
nalizing and self-deception by people tempted to undertake the 
same sort of wrong. Perhaps more often the material cooperation 
of "good" people leads others to cooperate formally or wrongly, 
even if only materially.152 
Scandal, however, can frequently be avoided, or at least significantly 
reduced, "by letting others know that such co-operation does not imply 
approval."153 
In sum, it would appear that in most abortion cases, a judge's material 
cooperation is permissible, particularly if a judge takes steps to avoid scan-
dal by letting others know that his or her legal decision does not imply 
approval of direct abortion. However, in the context of judicial bypass pro-
ceedings, where a judge determines that a minor is sufficiently mature to 
make the abortion decision without parental involvement, the material co-
operation may well be impermissible. (As discussed above, in a judicial 
bypass where a judge concludes that a minor is not sufficiently mature to 
make the abortion decision and determines that a direct abortion is in her 
best interests always constitutes formal cooperation.) For this reason, Cath-
olic judges should not decide judicial bypass proceedings. Moreover, since 
a petition seeking a judicial bypass would routinely seek relief in the alter-
native (the minor is mature; if not, abortion is in her best interests), even if 
the material cooperation as to the determination of maturity were permissi-
ble, there is good reason to avoid the proceeding in its entirety. 
V. RESIGNATION, RECUSAL, OR ONE-WAY RECUSAL 
What is a judge to do if confronted with a case in which the law re-
quires either formal cooperation in evil or impermissible material coopera-
tion in evil? Although some have argued that resignation is required, or 
proffered other alternatives, the best response is ordinarily recusal. 154 In this 
152. 3 GRISEZ, supra note 41, at 88l. 
153. I DAVIS, supra note 65, at 348. 
154. See, e.g., Avery Cardinal Dulles, Catholic Social Teaching and American Legal Practice, 
30 FORDHAM DRB. L.J. 277, 288 (2002) ("If the existing law is truly contrary to the conscientious 
convictions of the judge, the judge may have to recuse herself rather than cooperate in a morally 
evil action."); Bradley, supra note 116, at 289 ("If he can give judgment according to immoral 
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Part, I first address the competing arguments regarding recusal and resigna-
tion, explaining why recusal is usually sufficient and resignation usually 
unnecessary. I then consider and reject two alternatives that have been sug-
gested. Finally, I note an important interaction between the doctrine of co-
operation and the law of recusal. 
A. Recusal or Resignation 
Some have suggested that a judge must resign. Most notably, Justice 
Scalia has suggested that a Catholic judge who accepts current teaching on 
the death penalty should resign. Although he noted his awareness of the 
doctrine of material cooperation, his application was rather cursory, appar-
ently thinking that the only justification for such cooperation would be if 
the particular judge were somehow indispensable to society. 155 As we have 
seen, there are significant reasons for a judge to materially cooperate in sin. 
From the perspective of moral theology, it would seem that resignation 
would only be called for if the cases were so frequent as to cause cumula-
tive harm to the judge, such as by hardening his heart to injustice, diminish-
ing his solidarity for the victims of injustice, or losing the ability to offer 
credible witness against wrongdoing. 
Others have argued from a civil law perspective that moral objection to 
a law is not a basis for recusal and therefore a judge whose moral views 
prevent him from applying a law must resign.156 Under both the Model 
Code of Judicial Conduct, and under the relevant federal statute, judges are 
to recuse themselves if their impartiality can reasonably be questioned.157 
positive law without rendering himself formally or unfairly materially complicit in its immorality, 
and without giving scandal, then he may licitly do so .... If not, then he must recuse himself."); 
Kenneth Williams, Should Judges Who Oppose Capital Punishment Resign? A Reply to Justice 
Scalia. 10 VA. J. Soc. POL'y & L. 317. 342 (2003) ("There is another less drastic option than 
resignation available in the case of a judge who feels so strongly about the death penalty that he or 
she is unable to enforce it: recusal from the case."). 
155. Scalia, supra note 151 ("I find it hard to see how any appellate judge could find [that 
material cooperation in death penalty cases is permissible] unless he believes retaining his seat on 
the bench (rather than resigning) is somehow essential to preservation of the society-which is of 
course absurd."). Justice Scalia's perspective on resignation may be shaped by his role as the 
Circuit Justice for the Fifth Circuit; due to that assignment, he is likely involved in more death 
penalty cases than any other judge in the nation. 
156. See Letter from Paul D. Carrington et al. to Chief Justice Frank F. Drowota, III (Aug. 12, 
2(05), available at http://lib.law.washington.eduitennesseejudges.pdf [hereinafter Letter from 
Paul D. Carrington] (stating that the "two ethical and appropriate responses" are either to "rul[e] 
according to the law" or "resign from the bench if one's moral convictions prevent one from 
impartially applying" the law). 
157. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUcr Canon 3(E)(1) (2003), available at http://www.abanet. 
orglcpr/mcjcl ("A judge shall disqualify himself or berself in a proceeding in which the judge's 
impartiality might reasonably be questioned."); 28 U.S.c. § 455 (2000) ("Any justice, judge, or 
magistrate of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality 
might reasonably be questioned."). 
Although the Model Code also provides that "[a] judge shall hear and decide matters as-
signed to the judge except those in which disqualification is required," there is considerable ac-
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The impartiality of a judge whose moral views compel a particular result in 
a case can certainly be reasonably questioned. 158 Consider a judge who 
agrees with the analysis above and believes that finding an abortion to be in 
the best interests of a minor in a judicial bypass proceeding constitutes for-
mal cooperation in sin. Can there be any doubt that the judge's impartiality 
can reasonably be questioned? 
Indeed, some scholars who argue that judges should resign admit that 
"judicial recusal is ethically appropriate and perhaps required when a judge 
is convinced that his or her moral views render the judge unable to decide 
ceptance of a judicial practice of adopting a more prophylactic recusal policy. MODEL CODE OF 
IUD. CONDuer Canon 3(B)(1) (2003); see, e.g., Ross E. Davies, The Reluctant Recusants: Two 
Parables of Supreme Judicial Disqualifications, 10 GREEN BAG 79 (2006) (describing the general 
(but not absolute) practice of Justice Marshall to recuse in cases in which the NAACP participated 
from his appointment until 1984 and the praise this practice received); LESLIE W. ABRAMSON, 
JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION UNDER CANON 3 OF THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDuer 56-57 (2d ed. 
1992) (noting that "to avoid even the appearance of partiality, many judges routinely disqualify 
themselves, for a period of time or even indefinitely, from hearing any matters in which their 
former law office is involved, whether or not the particular matter was pending before the judge 
left the firm" even though recusal is not required that broadly) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted); Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 539 (1925): 
All we can say upon the whole matter is that, where conditions do not make it impracti-
cable, or where the delay may not injure public or private right, a judge, called upon to 
act in a case of contempt by personal attack upon him, may, without flinching from his 
duty, properly ask that one of his fellow judges take his place. 
158. See JEFFREY M. SHAMAN & JONA GoLDSCHMIDT, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: AN EM-
PIRICAL STUDY OF JUDICIAL PRACTICES AND ATITruDES 39-40 (American Judicature Society 
1995) (noting, in a discussion regarding disqualification in an abortion bypass proceeding, that if 
"the judge's opinion ... is so strongly held that the judge cannot be open minded or cannot fairly 
follow the law, the judge should be disqualified from presiding over the case"); Garvey & Coney 
[Barrett], supra note 43, at 334 ("Because the judge is unable to give the government the judg-
ment to which it is entitled under the law," the judge must disqualify himself); see also Rehearing 
on Abortion for Girl, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30,1982, at 128 (reporting decision of Michigan's Kent 
County Circuit Court that Judge Randall Hekrnan, who refused to approve an abortion, was dis-
qualified because "he only had one choice going in," and "[h]is choice was so preordained from 
the start of the hearing that this obviously did not become an impartial hearing"); RANDALL I. 
HEKMAN, JUSTICE FOR THE UNBORN 7 (1984) (stating that a "judge should disqualify himself when 
he cannot in good conscience enter an order required by the law"); id. at 155, 162-64 (finding that 
an abortion was not in a minor's best interest and concluding that his recusal was not necessary 
even though if the evidence "went the other way, 1 would still not be able to order an abortion ... 
unless ... necessary to save the life of the pregnant girl," because higher law superseded the 
Supreme Court); id. at 15 (stating Judge Hekman's belief that his decision was "not only morally 
right but ultimately legally right"); id. at 14-15 (reporting that, on appeal, Judge Robert Benson of 
the Kent County Circuit Court ruled that the minor was entitled to a "new hearing on her abortion 
request before a judge who would not have any preconceived notions as to the wrongfulness of 
abortion"); cf Michelle T. Friedland, Disqualification or Suppression: Due Process and the Re-
sponse to Judicial Campoign Speech, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 563, 593 (2004) (arguing that due 
process requires that if a judicial candidate "states an intention to ignore or violate" a clear legal 
rule, "she should be disqualified from hearing cases involving it"); United States v. Antar, 53 F.3d 
568,573 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding plain error in failure to recuse where district judge stated that his 
"object in this case from day one has always been to get back to the public that which was taken 
from it as a result of the fraudulent activities of this defendant and others"). 
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facts and law impartially in a particular case.,,159 They object, however, to 
blanket recusals in a category of cases rather than the exercise of "discretion 
in the circumstances of each case in deciding whether recusal is re-
quired."l60 They offer no authority for the proposition that recusal decisions 
must be made on a case-by-case discretionary basis rather than on a cate-
gorical basis. This is hardly surprising. Both the Model Code of Judicial 
Conduct and the relevant federal statute enumerate categories where recusal 
is required,161 and there is a common practice of judges creating recusal 
lists for the use of the clerk's office. 162 
159. Letter from Paul D. Carrington, supra note 156, at 1-2 (emphasis in original); see also 
John Leubsdorf, Theories of Judging and Judge Disqualification, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 237, 265-66 
(1987) (stating that under a cognitive approach to judging, "when a judge admits that he CamJot or 
will not appraise the merits of the case, either by saying so or by voluntarily withdrawing, disqual-
ification is appropriate") (footnote omitted); id. at 288 n.247 (arguing that under a constrained 
dialogue approach to judging, which he favors, "the principle of willingness to listen provides for 
disqualification when a judge is unable or unwilling to follow clear law" and that "for purposes of 
disqualification, one should look only to the judge's willingness to engage in the constrained 
dialogue of the law" so that disqualification is required of a judge who has moral "reasons for 
disregarding precedent that are not plausible with the legal system"). 
160. Letter from Paul D. Carrington, supra note 156, at 2. 
161. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUD. CoNDUCT Canon 3(E) (2003) (requiring recusal where 
the judge knows that he or she, individually or as a fiduciary, or the judge's spouse, 
parent or child wherever residing, or any other member of the judge's family residing in 
the judge's household, has an economic interest in the subject matter in controversy or 
in a party to the proceeding ... [or] the judge or the judge's spouse, or a person within 
the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person: (i) is a 
party to the proceeding, or an officer, director or trustee of a party; [or] (ii) is acting as a 
lawyer in the proceeding); 
28 U.S.c. § 455(b) (2000) (requiring recusal where a "lawyer with whom [the judge] previously 
practiced law served during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter" or where the 
judge 
knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child residing in his 
household, has a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to 
the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome 
of the proceeding, 
or the judge, the judge's spouse, "or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of 
them, or the spouse of such a person: (i) is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or 
trustee of a party; [or] (ii) is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding"); see also Leubsdorf, supra note 
159, at 259 (arguing that under a theory of political adjudication, 
Congress might ... forbid[ J any judge who defies clearly binding authority to hear 
future cases under the statute or constitutional clause in question [because] at some point 
one can say that a judge's beliefs are such that, when a particular provision is to be 
applied, the judge cannot be trusted to remain within the system). 
162. See, e.g., In re Cabletron Sys., Inc., 311 F.3d II, 22 (lst Cir. 2002) (referring to the 
"recusallists of the two other federal district judges in the District of New Hampshire"); D. Vt. R. 
5.2 
The Clerk's Office maintains a current list of companies in which each judge of this 
court, individually or as a fiduciary (including a judge's spouse or minor children who 
reside with the judge) holds a financial interest in, thereby requiring recusal. During 
initial case assignment, the Clerk's Office makes every effort to avoid known conflicts. 
Parties or counsel wishing to confirm that no financial conflict-of-interest exists in cases 
as assigned may obtain a copy of the Court's recusal list upon written request to the 
Clerk of Court. 
2006] CATHOLIC JUDGES AND COOPERATION IN SIN 261 
It is true that if a judge were to recuse too frequently it could be said 
that the judge is simply not doing the job required and unfairly burdening 
the other judges who must pick up the slack. This point, however, applies to 
recusals based on any reason, and is not limited to recusals based on moral-
ity. Our legal system, by requiring recusal for a wide range of reasons, 
contemplates that a judge is doing the job required even if he or she cannot 
hear every case assigned. 163 For example, recusal is required whenever the 
judge "served in government employment and in such capacity participated 
as counsel ... concerning the proceeding."l64 This provision can result in 
recusals in a large category of cases when a United States Attorney is ap-
pointed to the bench.165 So long as the frequency of recusals for moral 
reasons is comparable to an acceptable frequency of recusals for other rea-
sons-such as ownership of stock or having many close relatives who ap-
pear before the court166-there is no unfair burden on other judges and no 
need to resign. Thus the legal analysis here parallels the moral analysis: if 
the number of cases presenting the problem is sufficiently high, resignation 
may be appropriate. If not, resignation is unnecessary overkilL 
Professor Tamanaha does not dispute this legal analysis, but argues 
that when additional moral considerations-including the impact on other 
judges, the minor, and the law-are taken into account, resignation is the 
right response. 167 In calling for resignation, however, Professor Tamanaha 
makes no effort to address the importance of the frequency of recusals. But 
his concerns seem to depend largely on an assumption of a high frequency 
of recusals. 168 
Consider first the death penalty context. Suppose someone who con-
cludes that it would be sinful to sentence someone to death is appointed a 
United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota. The chance that 
this judge will ever be assigned a case in which the United States is seeking 
163. See Lori Ann Foertsch, Scalia's Duck Hunt Leads to Ruffled Feathers: How the U.S. 
Supreme Court and Other Federal Judiciaries Should Change Their Recusal Approach, 43 Hous. 
L. REv. 457, 461 (2006) (noting that Justice Scalia has averaged twelve recusals per year, Justice 
O'Connor thirty-one recusals per year, and Justice Breyer forty-two recusals per year). 
164. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(3) (2000). 
165. See U.S. v. Arnpriester, 37 F.3d 466, 467 (9th Cir. 1994) (requiring recusal and imputing 
to the United States Attorney "the knowledge and acts of his assistants"). 
166. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4) (requiring recusal where judge "or his spouse or minor child resid-
ing in his household, has a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to 
the proceeding"); 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5) (requiring recusal where judge "or his spouse, or a person 
within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person ... [i]s 
acting as a lawyer in the proceeding"). Cf. Richard Conway Casey, 74, Blind Federal Judge Dies, 
N.Y.TIMEs, Mar. 24, 2007, at CIO (noting that Judge Casey "did occaSionally swap a trademark 
case with a colleague because it depended on visual observation"). 
167. Tamanaha, supra note 38, at 275-76. 
168. Tamanaha, supra note 38, at 277-78. He makes passing mention of frequency, but does 
not develop the point; see id. at 277 (noting that "[j]udges who handle many of these cases thus 
put their positions at risk"). 
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the death penalty is remarkably low. 169 Suppose further that after serving on 
the bench for fifteen years, such a case is brought and assigned to this 
judge-and that the judge can reasonably predict that the chance of ever 
being assigned another one before retiring is vanishingly small. Surely there 
is scant reason to insist on resignation rather than recusal, at least in a legal 
regime that would require far more frequent recusals from a former United 
States Attorney who was appointed to the bench and that provides at least 
six other district judges for the district. 170 
It would be quite different if Congress were to create a United States 
Court for Terrorism Prosecutions, staffed with its own judges, and routinely 
seek the death penalty there. A judge of that court who later concluded that 
it was sinful to sentence someone to death should resign rather than hold the 
seat while routinely recusing from its cases. I71 But suppose that Congress 
were to create a United States Court for Terrorism Prosecutions and staff it 
with existing district judges designated by the Chief Justice. 172 Would it be 
permissible, in Professor Tamanaha's view, for a district judge to decline 
such a designation, or would the judge be obliged to resign as a district 
judge if the Chief Justice were to make such a designation? Surely the for-
mer is far more reasonable. 
Consider, now, the abortion bypass context. Suppose a judge of a state 
trial level criminal court has served ten years. Suppose further that one 
morning none of the judges appointed to the state family court, who ordina-
rily hear abortion bypass proceedings, are available, so the petition is as-
signed to him. He could reasonably predict that this would happen at most 
twice more during his career if he stayed on the bench. It is difficult for me 
to see why resignation is appropriate rather than recusal if we envision a 
handful of recusals on moral grounds over the course of a career-again, at 
least in a legal regime that has enough other judges and enough other work 
to be done that it would let him stay on the bench with far more frequent 
recusals if, say, his daughter were an assistant prosecutor. The burden on 
the legal system. as well as the burden on other judges, would be far greater 
169. See Death Penalty Information Center, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/state/ (2007) 
(noting that Minnesota does not have a death penalty statute); Jessica Branby, The Death Penalty 
in Minnesota: A Short History, http://www.twincitiesamnesty.org/mn_dpJesources.html (select 
"A Short History of the Death Penalty in Minnesota") (last visited Mar. 21, 2(07) (noting that the 
last execution in Minnesota occurred in 1906, and that Minnesota repealed its death penalty statute 
in 1911). I do not mean to suggest that the absence of a death penalty statute in the state of 
Minnesota forecloses the federal government from seeking the death penalty in a federal district 
court in that state. 
170. See 28 V.S.C. § 133 (2000). 
171. Cf Fugitive Slave Act of 1850,9 Stat. 462, § 3, repealed by 13 Stat. 200 (providing that 
"the Circuit Courts of the V nited States shall from time to time enlarge the number of the commis-
sioners, with a view to afford reasonable facilities to reclaim fugitives from labor, and to the 
prompt discharge of the duties imposed by this act"). 
172. Cf 50 V.S.c. § 1803(a) (2006) (establishing designation process for Vnited States For-
eign Intelligence Surveillance Court). 
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if a judge were obliged to resign the ftrst time he confronted a case that 
required recusal on moral grounds. 
Similarly, imagine if a state court system were to ordinarily rotate 
judges through a variety of different assignments in their early years on the 
bench before having them settle down in one assignment likely to last for 
the rest of their careers. Suppose someone who had been the head of a 
county prosecutor's office was appointed to the state bench. Given her 
background, skills, and interests, it was almost certain that eventually she 
would be assigned indeftnitely to criminal cases, but she faced a rotation in 
family court where, say, two percent of the cases were abortion bypass 
cases. If this state court system would assign her fewer criminal cases in her 
earlier years (or assign her to a different county) in order to accommodate 
her need to recuse from numerous prosecutions, why should she resign, 
rather than simply receive more child support cases (or even an extra rota-
tion hearing small claims cases) if she concluded that she could not hear 
abortion bypass cases? 
These illustrations, I believe, underscore the frequency of recusals 
matters. If the frequency of recusals is sufftciently high, resignation is ap-
propriate; otherwise, it is not. 173 
Professor Tamanaha suggests that abortion bypass cases are different, 
that, in effect, one cannot simply trade an abortion bypass case for a child 
custody case and call it even, the way that one can trade a case brought by a 
party in which one owns stock for a case brought by a different party. He 
contends that "[n]o judge wants to handle" abortion bypass cases, that 
"[e]very judge will ... recognize that a pregnant minor has no good options 
and a difftcult future," and that "[t]ragedy will follow no matter which way 
a judge rules.,,174 While many defenders of abortion rights have adopted 
this view of abortion, others criticize it as "play[ing] into the hands of our 
opponents."175 For a judge who thinks that "[b]emoaning abortion is like 
173. Just as "[olne should not refuse to appoint a judge because some day someone might sue 
her uncle," Leubsdorf, supra note 159, at 269, one should not insist on resignation when that day 
comes. 
174. Tamanaha, supra note 38, at 276-77. 
175. Caitlin Borgmann & Catherine Weiss, Beyond Apocalypse and Apology: A Moral De-
fense of Abortion, 35 PERSP. OF SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 40, 41 (2003); see also Katha Pollitt, 
Prochoice Puritans, THE NATION, Feb. \3, 2006, at 9 (criticizing those who "think abortion is 
tragic and terrible and wrong" and arguing that the debate is "too moralistic already"); MARLENE 
GERBER FRIED, Abortion in the United States-Legal But Inaccessible, in ABORTION WARS: A 
HALF-CENTURY OF STRU<3(lLE, 1950-2000 at 208, 224 (Rickie Solinger ed., Univ. of Cal. Press 
1998) ("We must reject pro-choice sentiments like President Clinton's that take the form of saying 
that abortion should be legal but rare"); id. ("We have to disagree when our erstwhile allies call 
abortion a 'necessary tragedy.' Abortion is no tragedy. No moral slip for Which we forgive hap-
less, weak women. Abortion is ... as profoundly ethical an act as any of us will ever see.") 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Josh Gerstein, Could Edwards become First Wo-
man President?, N.Y. SUN, Mar. 8,2007 (noting that Kate Miche1man is still fuming over Hillary 
Clinton's description of abortion as a "sad, even tragic choice to many, many women," and may 
never forgive her for suggesting that abortion should be rare). 
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lamenting open-heart surgery in the face of Americans' unacceptably high 
rate of heart disease,"176 a case that calls upon him to decide whether an 
abortion is in a minor's best interests is as much an opportunity for doing 
good as a case that asks whether open-heart surgery is in the best interests 
of an incompetent patient. Evidence suggests that most judges do not ago-
nize over these proceedings: The overwhelming majority of bypass peti-
tions are granted after very short hearings. I77 
As long as there are judges-state or federal-who believe in the mo-
rality of abortion, there will be judges to vindicate the minor's legal right. 
And if the day comes that there are no judges in a given particular state, no 
judges in a particular circuit, and no judges on the Supreme Court who 
believe in the morality of abortion, the political and legal culture will have 
already changed so substantially that Roe will have long become a fixture in 
the anti-canon of constitutional law.118 
B. Other Suggested Alternatives 
i. Decline to Rule at All in Abortion Bypass Cases 
It has also been suggested that judges in abortion bypass cases should 
decline to rule, thereby permitting abortion by operation of law. From a 
legal perspective, this proposal calls for the judge to simply abandon her 
work while retaining the office. I do not see how this can be justified. It 
seems to me that the judge must either give up the office by resigning, do 
her job and decide the case in accordance with the law, or recuse (in accor-
dance with the law) and thereby cause the case to be assigned to another 
judge. From a moral perspective, this proposal calls for the judge to simply 
abandon the girl: No one decides if she is mature enough to make the deci-
sion on her own and no one with legal authority to do so decides (if she is 
not mature) what is in her best interests. If she is, in fact, too immature to 
make the decision herself, a judge who simply declines to rule is aban-
doning her, either to her own insufficiently mature devices, or to the pres-
sures of others. 
Here, one can see the value of situating the doctrine of cooperation in 
the context of charity and fraternal correction. The focus of avoiding mate-
rial cooperation should not be on keeping one's own hands clean, but rather 
on concern for one's sisters and brothers. Refusing to rule and thereby 
176. Borgmann & Weiss, supra note 175, at 41 ("We hope never to need a coronary bypass, 
but we are grateful to have the procedure available if we need it."). 
177. See Collett, supra note 123, at 522-24 (noting, for example, that of 3573 bypass petitions 
filed in Minnesota between August 1, 1981 and March 1, 1986, only nine were denied, and that a 
study in Massachusetts showed that the average length of a hearing was 12.12 minutes). 
178. See generally I.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 
HARV. L. REV. 963 (1998); Richard A. Primus, Canon, Anti-Canon, and Judicial Dissent, 48 
DUKE L.J. 243 (1998). 
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abandoning the girl smacks of concern, not for the girl, but for keeping the 
judge's hands clean. I79 
ii. One-Way Recusal 
On the other hand, some have suggested what could be dubbed a one-
way recusal. Under this proposal, articulated by Michael Paulsen but per-
haps held by others, a judge decides the case on legal grounds in his own 
mind. If that legal conclusion adheres with the judge's moral duties, the 
judge issues the decision. If, however, that legal conclusion is inconsistent 
with the judge's moral duties, the judge recuses at that point. 180 
Although this approach is tempting, and there may be situations in 
which the moral issue does not crystallize in a judge's mind until the point 
of decision, it is ultimately not appropriate as a general approach. "How a 
judge ultimately decides a case has no effect on whether he had a duty to 
disqualify himself at the outset."181 Both as a matter of efficiency and of 
fairness, recusal should be done at the outset of a case, not at what would 
otherwise be its conclusion. 182 It is incredibly inefficient and burdensome to 
the judicial system for a judge to hear and tentatively decide a case, only to 
recuse at that point. In a trial court, everything would have to be repeated 
before another judge. In an appellate court, a different panel would have to 
be constituted, perhaps with all new judges because the now-recused judge 
participated in the deliberations regarding the case. I83 It would be particu-
larly burdensome if the judge knew all along recusal might be necessary if 
the correct legal result turned out to be what one of the parties sought. 
179. Note that in Matthew's account, Pilate did not recuse himself and have a different Roman 
official judge the case, but instead refused to rule and let those who had brought Jesus to him have 
their way. Matthew 27:24 ("When Pilate saw that he was getting nowhere, but that instead an 
uproar was starting, he took water and washed his hands in front of the crowd. 'I am innocent of 
this man's blood,' he said. 'It is your responsibility!"'). Cf Mark 15:9-15; Luke 23:13-25; John 
19: 12-16 (describing Pilate's actions without the hand-washing account). See also CATECHISM OF 
THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note II, No. 185 (Nicene Creed) ("For our sake he was crucified 
under Pontius Pilate."). 
180. Paulsen, supra note 60, at 78-79 (advocating recusal "after thorough legal investigation 
of the possibilities that the case may not in fact be controlled by Roe," and urging that a '1udge 
should not recuse himself in advance of the case, as one pro-life lower federal court judge is 
rumored to do in any case involving abortion"). 
181. Monroe H. Freedman, Judicial Impaniality in the Supreme Court-The Troubling Case 
of Justice Stephen Breyer, 30 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 513, 523 (2005); 
182. See Leubsdorf, supra note 159, at 265 ("The court should decide early in a case whether 
the judge should withdraw."); Freedman, supra note 181, at 527 ("Again, the decision regarding 
recusal [i]s to be made at the outset of the case."). 
183. See, e.g., United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Questionnaire of Judge Sa-
muel Alito 55, http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/Alito_Questionnaire.pdf (reporting that after he re-
cused himself in a case, he requested "that a new panel of judges be appointed to rehear the 
case"); but see Committee on Codes of Conduct, Advisory Opinion No. 71 (Dec. 14, 1981), 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/guide/voI2nl.htrnl (concluding that where one judge is re-
cused after conference, "the remaining two judges on the panel are not disqualified merely be-
cause they conferred with the disqualified judge"). 
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The importance of timeliness is reflected in the law of recusal in at 
least two ways. First, some otherwise-required recusals can be avoided by 
divestiture, if "after substantial judicial time has been devoted to the matter, 
because of the appearance or discovery" of an otherwise disqualifying fi-
nancial interest. 184 That is, the law of recusal is sensitive to the waste of 
judicial resources. Second, "[m]ost circuits require that a motion for dis-
qualification be brought at the earliest possible moment after obtaining 
knowledge of facts demonstrating the basis for such a claim."18s Just as a 
litigant "cannot wait until after an unfavorable judgment before bringing the 
information to the court's attention,"186 a judge should not wait until after 
reaching an unfavorable decision in his own mind before deciding to 
recuse. 
Moreover, if a judge believes that only one result in a case would be 
morally acceptable, the judge's impartiality could reasonably be questioned. 
Consider again a judge who believes that finding an abortion to be in the 
best interests of a minor in the judicial bypass constitutes formal coopera-
tion in evil. Suppose the judge were to hear the case nevertheless, and de-
cide that a direct abortion was not in the minor's best interests. Surely the 
judge's impartiality in reaching that conclusion could reasonably be ques-
tioned; by hypothesis, he could not decide the case the other way no matter 
how clear the law and the facts. 
Although for these reasons, Paulsen's suggestion of one-way recusal is 
not appropriate, one aspect of Paulsen's proposal should be adopted. He 
argues that when a judge recuses on moral grounds, the judge should ex-
plain the basis of the recusal. 187 Nothing in the law prevents such explana-
tions, and they not only may help others to understand the decision, but also 
may reduce the risk of scandal associated with cases where the judge does 
not recuse. 188 
184. 28 U.S.C. § 455(f) (1983). 
185. Alan Hirsch, Recusal: Analysis of Case Law under 28 U.s.c. §§ 455 & 144, at 57 (2002), 
available at http://www.fjc.govllibrary/fjc3atalog.nsf (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted). 
186. United States v. Rogers, 119 F.3d 1377, 1380 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Leslie W. Abran1-
son, Appearance of Impropriety: Deciding When a Judge's Impartiality "Might Reasonably Be 
Questioned," 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 55, 70 (2000) (noting that "the judge should be the first to 
raise the issue by recusing in a particular case"). 
187. Paulsen, supra note 60, at 78-79 (urging recusal "accompanied by a full 'judicial' opin-
ion explaining ... why the judge must therefore decline to enforce [Roe], and must recuse him-
self from rendering a decision on the merits of the case before him"). 
188. Bradley, supra note 116, at 289 
The real alternatives to giving judgment according to the (unjust) positivist law are to 
recuse oneself from the case or to resign the office. Either move should be accompanied 
by a clear public statement of the reasons for doing so; the people who trusted one with 
judicial responsibility are entitled to be told why this exercise of the judicial office 
cannot, in good conscience, be performed. 
Some have objected that an explanation of the reason for recusal "undermines confidence in 
the judiciary's commitment to uphold state law." Letter from Paul D. Carrington, supra note 156, 
at 2. This objection is puzzling for two reasons: First, it is rare to see judges criticized for explain-
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C. The Interaction of Cooperation and Recusal 
Finally, note the interaction between the moral theology of cooperation 
and the civil law of recusal: The more situations in which the principles of 
cooperation prohibit judges from acting in ways that are at variance from 
Catholic teaching, the more situations in which the civil law of recusal will 
prevent those judges from hearing those cases at all. If it is impermissible 
material cooperation for a judge to find an anti-abortion law unconstitu-
tional, then the judge may not entertain such a case-even if at the end of 
the day the judge would have upheld the constitutionality of the law on 
legal grounds. In other words, if the Catholic Church were to convince 
Catholic judges that they cannot (as a moral matter) find laws against abor-
tion unconstitutional, those judges will not (as a legal matter) be able to 
decide cases challenging those laws at all. 189 If Catholic judges are to de-
cide such cases at all, they must decide them in accordance with the law. l90 
VI. CONCLUSION 
To those who are worried that Catholic judges will not be faithful to 
the law, I urge you to bear in mind that the Catholic Church does not at-
tempt to outlaw all sins, that much material cooperation is permissible, and 
that in the rare case that involves formal cooperation or impermissible ma-
terial cooperation, the judge may recuse himself. Such cases are sufficiently 
uncommon that there is unlikely to be any need to resign. 
To those who are worried that Catholic judges will not be faithful to 
the Church, I urge you as well to bear in mind that the Catholic Church 
does not attempt to outlaw all sins, and that much material cooperation is 
permissible. I further urge you not to assume that a judge is engaged in 
formal cooperation, remembering that the very same outward action may 
constitute formal or material cooperation depending on the judge's intent. I 
also urge you not to attempt to make material cooperation less permissible 
than the received tradition allows, because if you succeed, the law will re-
quire more recusals, perhaps even resignations. Put bluntly: if you want 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito to overrule 
ing their decisions, rather than criticized for failure to explain them. Second, recusal where one's 
impartiality can reasonably be questioned is designed to enhance confidence in the judiciary's 
commitment to impartial adjudication of cases in accordance with the law. The recused judge, 
after all, is not deciding the case at all, but leaving it to be decided by another judge in accordance 
with the law. Cj. Foertsch, supra note 163, at 460 ("Justices, as well as other federal judges, 
should provide a written explanation any time recusal is an issue, whether it is accepted or de-
nied."); Public Util. Comm. v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 467 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.) (UI am explicit as 
to the reason for my non-participation ... because I have for some time been of the view that it is 
desirable to state why one takes himself out on a case."). 
189. Cj. Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Codispoti, 69 F.3d 399, 399 (9th Cir. 1995) (deny-
ing motion to recuse made by abortion clinic). 
190. See Compassion in Dying v. Wash., 49 F.3d 586,594 (9th Cir. 1995) (emphasizing that 
the "compass of a federal judge ... is the Constitution of the United States"). 
268 UNNERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [VoL 4:2 
Roe; you must accept that it is not necessarily sinful for Justice Kennedy (or 
Chief Justice Roberts or Justice Alito) to uphold it. Finally, to the extent 
that the real concern about judicial action is the risk of scandal, I urge you 
to focus directly, cleary, and emphatically on that risk-probably using a 
more accessible term than "scandal"-and perhaps even suggest ways that 
judges might be able to reduce the risk of scandal. 
Finally, to Catholic judges: I urge you not to forget your moral obliga-
tions. You are not a slave to the legal order. Your job usually involves 
permissible material cooperation, but watch your intent, and take care that 
the cumulative impact of material cooperation does not lead you to slide 
from material to formal cooperation or alter your fundamental commitment. 
I also urge you to pay close attention to risk of scandal, remembering that 
scandal can frequently be avoided (or at least significantly reduced) by let-
ting others know that cooperation does not imply approval. You can do this 
by explaining the difference between one's legal judgment and one's moral 
judgment, perhaps in a judicial opinion, as Judge Walker and the late Judge 
Casey did in a partial birth abortion case,191 or perhaps in a different forum, 
as Judge Nygaard did in a Catholic magazine article about the death penalty 
after upholding one on habeas. 192 Finally, while I certainly do not wish St. 
Thomas More's fate on any judge, I do pray that, when your race is run, 
you,like him, can say that you die the King's good servant, but God's first. 
191. Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 278, 290 (2d Cir. 2(06) (Walker, C.J., con-
curring) (describing binding Supreme Court precedent as effectively holding "that the deeply dis-
turbing-and morally offensive-destruction of the life of a partially bom child cannot be banned 
by a legislature without an exception for the mother's health (as detennined by her doctor)"); id. at 
296 ("In today's case, we are compelled by a precedent to invalidate a statute that bans a morally 
repugnant practice."); see also Nat'! Abortion Fed'n v. Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp. 2d 436, 479 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (Casey, J.) (finding as a matter of fact that "D & X is a gruesome, brutal, bar-
baric, and uncivilized medical procedure" but nevertheless concluding as a matter of law that 
statute prohibiting it is unconstitutional). 
192. Richard L. Nygaard, "Vengeance is Mine," Says the Lord, AM., Oct. 8, 1994, at 6. 
